Approaching the Truth via Belief Change in Propositional Languages

Cevolani, Gustavo; Calandra, Francesco

doi:10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8_5

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Niiniluoto (2011) and others Cevolani and Calandra (2010), Schurz (2011) for example have investigated general properties concerning how the truthlikeness measure of a belief base changes in relation to the process of belief revision.…”

Section: Belief Merging As Truthlikeness Maximisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Belief merging with the aim of truthlikeness

D’Alfonso¹

2015

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The merging/fusion of belief/data collections in propositional logic form is a topic that has received due attention within the domains of database and AI research. A distinction can be made between two types of scenarios to which the process of merging can be applied. In the first type, the collections represent preferences, such as the voting choices of a group of people, that need to be aggregated so as to give a consistent result that in some way best represents the collective judgement of the group. In the second type, the collections represent factual data that is to be aggregated with an aim of obtaining a result that maximises factual correctness. After introducing a general framework for belief merging via some prominent literature on the topic, this paper then introduces and considers a method for belief merging with the second type of scenario in mind. Its suitability is corroborated by demonstrating how it can be seen as a special case of a merging procedure that combines aggregation of probabilities and maximisation of expected truthlikeness.

show abstract

Section: Belief Merging As Truthlikeness Maximisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Belief merging with the aim of truthlikeness

D’Alfonso¹

2015

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For example, if g i is ?Q 1 Q 2 ?Q 3 :Q 4 , then PC i = {Q 2 } and NC i = {Q 4 }. Cevolani and Calandra (2010) have studied in propositional logic ''conjunctive propositions'' which make positive or negative claims about some of the basic atomic propositions. The notion of c-generalization is thus a direct generalization of such conjunctive propositions.…”

Section: Convex Generalizationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revising Beliefs Towards the Truth

Niiniluoto

2011

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Belief revision (BR) and truthlikeness (TL) emerged independently as two research programmes in formal methodology in the 1970s. A natural way of connecting BR and TL is to ask under what conditions the revision of a belief system by new input information leads the system towards the truth. It turns out that, for the AGM model of belief revision, the only safe case is the expansion of true beliefs by true input, but this is not very interesting or realistic as a model of theory change in science. The new accounts of non-prioritized belief revision do not seem more promising in this respect, and the alternative BR account of updating by imaging leads to other problems. Still, positive results about increasing truthlikeness by belief revision may be sought by restricting attention to special kinds of theories. Another approach is to link truthlikeness to epistemic matters by an estimation function which calculates expected degrees of truthlikeness relative to evidence. Then we can study how the expected truthlikeness of a theory changes when probabilities are revised by conditionalization or imaging. Again, we can ask under what conditions such changes lead our best theories towards the truth.

show abstract

Basic and Refined Nomic Truth Approximation by Evidence-Guided Belief Set Revision

Kuipers

2019

Nomic Truth Approximation Revisited

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Approaching the Truth via Belief Change in Propositional Languages

Cited by 5 publications

References 10 publications

Belief merging with the aim of truthlikeness

Belief merging with the aim of truthlikeness

Revising Beliefs Towards the Truth

Basic and Refined Nomic Truth Approximation by Evidence-Guided Belief Set Revision

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About