2014
DOI: 10.1080/07329113.2014.932961
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Appointment of constitutional adjudicators in Africa: some perspectives on how different systems yield similar outcomes

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

1
3
0

Year Published

2017
2017
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
7

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 7 publications
(4 citation statements)
references
References 12 publications
1
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…The analysis of network representation on Benin’s Constitutional Court bench empirically supports the importance of appointments to the highest courts. This is in line with earlier scholarly statements about the risks of one-sided politicised appointments in Africa (Adouki, 2013; Fombad, 2014). I have drawn attention to the balanced integration of the courts into relevant networks, acknowledging that ‘neutral’ judges may not exist, but equidistant benches may.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 91%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…The analysis of network representation on Benin’s Constitutional Court bench empirically supports the importance of appointments to the highest courts. This is in line with earlier scholarly statements about the risks of one-sided politicised appointments in Africa (Adouki, 2013; Fombad, 2014). I have drawn attention to the balanced integration of the courts into relevant networks, acknowledging that ‘neutral’ judges may not exist, but equidistant benches may.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 91%
“…What makes courts credible arbiters of political disputes and brings them into the position to facilitate or even foster the consolidation of unlikely democracies? Similar to other African scholars in the field of judicial politics who directly hold appointment practices responsible for the legitimation and functional performance of African courts (Adouki, 2013;Fombad, 2014), I argue that the representation of networks on the bench (see Dressel et al, 2018) critically affect the court's reputation and credibility. Due to the court's reputational decline in the recent past, the Constitutional Court of Benin (CCB) presents a pertinent case for empirically examining the link between (objective) network structures and (subjective) perceived credibility.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 60%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This has notable consequences for how courts are configured, judicial independence and autonomy, levels of professionalism, judicial legitimacy, judicial reform and performance. The influence of informal networks on appointments, discipline and promotion might politicise judicial behaviour and heighten the likelihood of on-bench conflict (Fombad, 2014; Sanchez Urribarri, 2011). Patronage networks can undermine judicial integrity by facilitating promotion or otherwise rewarding ‘loyal’ judges (Gomez, 2011).…”
Section: The Effects Of Informal Relations and Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%