Applying Jackson’s Methodological Ideal-Types: Problems of Differentiation and Classification

Abstract

In The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, Patrick Jackson situates methodologies in International Relations in relation to their underlying philosophical assumptions. One of his aims is to map International Relations debates in a way that 'capture[s] current controversies' (p. 40). This ambition is overstated: whilst Jackson's typology is useful as a clarificatory tool, (re)classifying existing scholarship in International Relations is more problematic. One problem with Jackson's approach is that he tends to run together the philosophical assumptions which decisively differentiate his methodologies (by stipulating a distinctive warrant for knowledge claims) and the explanatory strategies that are employed to generate such knowledge claims, suggesting that the latter are entailed by the former. In fact, the explanatory strategies which Jackson associates with each methodology reflect conventional practice in International Relations just as much as they reflect philosophical assumptions. This makes it more difficult to identify each methodology at work than Jackson implies. I illustrate this point through a critical analysis of Jackson's controversial reclassification of Waltz as an analyticist, showing that whilst Jackson's typology helps to expose inconsistencies in Waltz's approach, it does not fully support the proposed reclassification. The conventional aspect of methodologies in International Relations also raises questions about the limits of Jackson's 'engaged pluralism'.

Bringing Morgenthau’s ethics in: pluralism, incommensurability and the turn from fragmentation to dialogue in IR

“…As Tickner argues, however, ‘even if, following Jackson, one were to embrace a pluralist, post-foundational definition of ‘science,’ the core–periphery structure that is entrenched in Global IR (and, indeed, nearly all social science) would remain basically untouched’ (2013: 642). This critique echoes earlier reviews of Jackson’s Conduct of Inquiry that problematised not only Jackson’s typology of methodological pluralism (Humphreys, 2013; Wight, 2013), and omission of ‘other-worldliness’ (Acharya, 2011), but also his underplaying of the political interests that divide these ‘methodologies’, in favour of a liberal ethos of tolerance (Suganami, 2013). In other words, what distinguishes methodologies is neither logic nor reason, but political interests that Jackson simply forgot.…”

Ways of Knowing Agency and Development: notes on the philosophy of science and the conduct and use of inquiry

“…However, whereas his claim rests on his deterministic proposal, this paper understands methodology rather as complexes of philosophical assumptions, practices, and methods, related to one another by logic as well as convention. As a result, philosophy does not determine which research strategies (and methods) are adequate but the ends themselves to which they are employed (Humphreys 2013).…”

Problem badawczy

“…Podczas namysłu nad nimi nie-Problem badawczy zbędny jest bardzo wysoki stopień krytycyzmu polegający na wykazywaniu różnego rodzaju błędów oraz walorów przedmiotu analizy teoretycznej 22 . Zmierzaniu do całkowitego wyeliminowania błędów powinno towarzyszyć dążenie do ich poprawienia, przy jednoczesnym zachowaniu tych właściwości, które zostały ocenione przez badacza pozytywnie 23 . Tylko takie podejście umożliwia bowiem stworzenie oryginalnych, a jednocześnie w jak najwyższym stopniu funkcjonalnych typów idealnych.…”