Applying Intelligence to the Reflexes: Embodied Skills and Habits between Dreyfus and Descartes

Sutton, John; McIlwain, Doris; Christensen, Wayne; Geeves, Andrew

doi:10.1080/00071773.2011.11006732

Cited by 140 publications

(107 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(21 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

101

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Christensen et al (2015) argue that instructional nudges-urging oneself on with encouragement, commands, orders, and directives like BWatch the Ball!^or BKeep it up!^or BDo it!^-are not detrimental to expertise (Cf. Sutton 2007, Sutton et al 2011, and Christensen et al (2015). Why not consider instructional nudges to be a form of self-awareness?…”

Section: The Telic Awareness Of Agency In Expert Bodily Actionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Just doing what I do: on the awareness of fluent agency

Dow

2015

Phenom Cogn Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Hubert Dreyfus has argued that cases of absorbed bodily coping show that there is no room for self-awareness in flow experiences of experts. In this paper, I argue against Dreyfus' maxim of vanishing self-awareness by suggesting that awareness of agency is present in expert bodily action. First, I discuss the phenomenon of absorbed bodily coping by discussing flow experiences involved in expert bodily action: merging into the flow; immersion in the flow; emergence out of flow. I argue against the claim that flow experience does not involve an awareness of agency for each of these features, while conceding that fluent agency does not involve self-awareness in the thetic sense. I challenge the assumption that the awareness of fluent agency must be understood in terms of a thetic awareness of agency. Instead, I develop an Anscombean account of the awareness of fluent agency in terms of the phenomenal character of knowing one's aims. I respond to the challenge that if an Anscombean account of the awareness of agency is to succeed, then agents must be able to answer Anscombean questions. I consider the objection that awareness of agency is not a form of self-awareness by outlining an account of self-awareness as self-synthesis that is distinct from self-perception and selfascription, but which makes room for self-awareness in expert bodily action.

show abstract

Section: The Telic Awareness Of Agency In Expert Bodily Actionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Just doing what I do: on the awareness of fluent agency

Dow

2015

Phenom Cogn Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Thus, information about the characteristics of the bike's suspension that she gained from feedback while riding had an immediate influence on Kath's proximal bike control, but also affected her strategy for later obstacles and overall riding approach. Her approach to the obstacle gave her room to alter her path or come to an early stop if performance went awry, which is what happened in the first attempt, and relied on an embodied ability to make on-the-fly adjustments to technique (Sutton et al, 2011;Christensen et al, in press). …”

Section: High Order Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

The sense of agency and its role in strategic control for expert mountain bikers.

Christensen¹,

Bicknell²,

McIlwain³

et al. 2015

Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Much work on the sense of agency has focused either on abnormal cases, such as delusions of control, or on simple action tasks in the laboratory. Few studies address the nature of the sense of agency in complex natural settings, or the effect of skill on the sense of agency. Working from 2 case studies of mountain bike riding, we argue that the sense of agency in high-skill individuals incorporates awareness of multiple causal influences on action outcomes. This allows fine-grained differentiation of the contributions of self and external factors to action outcomes. We further argue that the sense of agency incorporates prospective awareness of actions that are possible in a situation and awareness of the limits of control. These forms of sense of agency enable highly flexible, context-sensitive strategic control, and are likely to contribute to high interindividual variability in responses to complex tasks.

show abstract

“…Dreyfus contrasts between "two distinct kinds of intentional behavior: deliberative, planned action, and spontaneous, transparent coping" (Dreyfus, 2002). Transparent absorbed coping is prominent at "high levels of expertise, whether in sport, chess, nursing, or driving, [such that] action management and decision-making do not even appear as problems for the expert practitioner [master]" (Sutton et al, 2011). We encounter ourselves primarily in the actual acts that arise out of our intentions, rather than by directly looking at the intentions that might or might not give rise to acts (Okrent, 1999).…”

Section: Being-in-the-world-(thrown)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Dreyfus describes a fundamental dichotomy between what he calls "two distinct kinds of intentional behavior: deliberative, planned action, and spontaneous, transparent coping" (Dreyfus, 2002a). Intuitive absorbed coping is prominent at "high levels of expertise, whether in sport, chess, nursing, or driving, [such that] action management and decision-making do not even appear as problems for the expert practitioner [master]" (Sutton et al, 2011). This "coping" is clearly action, rather than involuntary reflex reaction to stimulation, and involves learned sequences of movement-but it does not require any deliberation or planning in advance and does not occupy attention while occurring (Webber, 2002).…”

Section: Leadership As Care (Action)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Phenomenology of Leadership

Souba¹

2014

OJL

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Teaching people about leadership is different from creating leaders. Teaching leadership uses a third-person approach to impart someone else's knowledge, which grants learners limited direct access to the being and actions of effective leaders. In contrast, creating leaders entails a firstperson phenomenological methodology, which provides direct access to what it means to be a leader and what it means to exercise good leadership in real time, with real results. The distinctiveness of the first-person "as-lived/lived-through" approach lies in its capacity to disclose the hidden contexts that shape the ways of being, thinking, and acting that are the source of the leader's performance. When these contexts become unveiled, it allows for the creation of new contexts that give leaders more space and more degrees of freedom to lead effectively as their natural selfexpression. A phenomenological inquiry into leadership does not study the attributes of leaders, but rather the fundamental structures of human "being" that make it possible to be a leader in the first place. Because the phenomenological "facts" of lived experience reside in language, creating for oneself what it is to be a leader entails mastering a special language (that includes terms like intentionality; thrownness; being-in-the-world; clearing-for-action; absorbed coping; hermeneutic; and, break-down) from which leaders can orient their being, thinking, and actions. Learning to be a leader is not first and foremost about the acquisition of knowledge or certain personal attributes. Rather, only when leadership becomes an as-lived/lived-through experience does it grant access to its actual nature and essence.

show abstract

Applying Intelligence to the Reflexes: Embodied Skills and Habits between Dreyfus and Descartes

Cited by 140 publications

References 25 publications

Just doing what I do: on the awareness of fluent agency

Just doing what I do: on the awareness of fluent agency

The sense of agency and its role in strategic control for expert mountain bikers.

The Phenomenology of Leadership

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About