Applying economic psychology to the problem of executive compensation.

Abstract

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Paying it forward? The mixed effects of organizational inducements on executive mentoring

“…The effects of transactional inducements in the workplace have been primarily examined through the lens of agency theory, which assumes people are self‐interested actors (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, ; Pepper, ). More specifically, agency theory focuses on the exchange between principals and agents and the use of inducements to ensure that agents act in the principal's interests.…”