Application Study of Hardware-Based Security for Future Industrial IoT

Matischek, Rainer; Bara, Benjamin

doi:10.1109/dsd.2019.00044

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 24 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Although OPC UA has built-in security features, it still requires stringent security configurations to work properly, preventing attackers from gaining access to sensitive data through port theft, wireless eavesdropping, and other means [22,23].…”

Section: Opc Ua-based Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Replay-Attack Detection and Prevention Mechanism in Industry 4.0 Landscape for Secure SECS/GEM Communications

et al. 2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Starting from the First Industrial Revolution to the current and Fourth Industrial Revolution (or Industry 4.0), various industrial machines are present in the market and manufacturing companies. As standardized protocols have become increasingly popular, more utilities are switching to Internet Protocol (IP)-based systems for wide-area communication. SECS/GEM is one of the standards that permit industries to collect information directly from the machines, either using RS323 or TCP/IP communication. TCP/IP communication is becoming more critical than ever, especially given our accelerated digital transformation and increasing reliance on communication technologies. The growth of IT is accelerating with cyberthreats as well. In contrast, security features in the SECS/GEM protocol may be neglected by some companies as it is only used in factories and not mostly used in the outside world. However, communication of SECS/GEM is highly susceptible to various cyberattacks. This paper analyzes the potential replay-attack cyberattacks that can occur on a SECS/GEM system. In replay attacks, this paper supposes an adversary that wants to damage an operation-based control system in an ongoing condition. The adversary has the ability to capture messages to watch and record their contents for a predetermined amount of time, record them, and then replay them while attacking in order to inject an exogenous control input undetected. The paper’s objectives are to prove that SECS/GEM communication is vulnerable to cyberattack and design a detection mechanism to protect SECS/GEM communications from replay attacks. The methodology implements a simulation of the replay-attack mechanism on SECS/GEM communication. The results indicate that the design mechanism detected replay attacks against SECS/GEM communications and successfully prevented them.

show abstract

Section: Opc Ua-based Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Replay-Attack Detection and Prevention Mechanism in Industry 4.0 Landscape for Secure SECS/GEM Communications

et al. 2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Their focus is on securing a gateway node, but they also discuss about ideas of using sealed keys bound to certain TPM PCR values. Another example of using OPC UA with remote attestation is by Matischek and Bara (2019). Instead of TPM they propose the use of a Secure Element (SE).…”

Section: Opc Uamentioning

confidence: 99%

Combining System Integrity Verification with Identity and Access Management

Kylänpää

Salonen

2022

eccws

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Digital transformation and the utilization of Industrial IoT (IIoT) introduces numerous interconnected devices to factories increasing among others the challenge of managing their software versions and giving attackers new possibilities to exploit various software vulnerabilities. Factory networks were earlier isolated from the Internet. However, this separation is no longer valid and there can be connections that allow intruders to penetrate into information systems of factories. Another issue is that although factories typically are physically isolated, it is not necessarily safe to assume that physical security is in good shape as the novel supply networks comprise subcontracted activities and temporary work force. Another threat can also arise from unauthorized monitoring of devices and the unauthorized replacement of existing ones. Based on the previous, it is crucial that IIoT security should be built into factories of the future (FoF) right from the design phase and even low-end devices need to be supported. Trusted computing concept called remote attestation should be used. Remote attestation allows remote parties to verify the integrity of each system component. System components should include trusted hardware components that can be used to measure executable software. The term measurement means calculating the cryptographic hash of the binary component before passing control to it. Trusted hardware components should also have a mechanism to protect the integrity of the measurement list and cryptographic keys that can be used to sign integrity assertions. The verifier part should have a storage of reference integrity metrics identifying the expected values of these measurements. Deploying trusted computing and remote attestation concepts to industrial automation is not straightforward. Even if it is possible to use remote attestation with suitable hardware components, it is not clear how remote attestation should be integrated with various operational technology (OT) industrial automation protocols. Approaches to use remote attestation with existing industrial automation protocols (e.g., OPC UA) is discussed. Advanced identity and access management (e.g., OAuth2, OpenID Connect) can be used to combine integrity measurements with device identity information so that the remote attestation process is triggered by authentication during the first transaction. The focus is on machine-to-machine (M2M) communications with immutable device identities and integrity evidence transfer.

show abstract