Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) (Preliminary Objections) (I.C.J.)

Abstract

On November 8, 2019, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a highly anticipated judgment on the preliminary objections raised by the Russian Federation with respect to the lack of the Court's jurisdiction over the claims brought by Ukraine under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT). The Court overwhelmingly rejected all of Russia's preliminary objections under both Conventions and confirmed the admissibility of Ukraine's claims under the CERD. Therefore, Ukraine's case will be heard on the merits in its entirety.

The “MH17” judgment and its legal implications for the International Court of Justice's ruling in Ukraine v. Russia: a critical appraisal

“…51.2 rightly pinpointed in the academic literature, the employment of certain means of warfare, which are unable to discriminate between civil and military targets, would be "tantamount to direct targeting of civilians"; this, in turn, would be punishable under the ICSFT if these means correspond to the funds pursuant to article 2, paragraph 1. 59 For this reason, the question as to whether the convention prohibits the collection or provision of funds under article 2, paragraph 1 of the ICSFT, cannot go unnoticed. As can be aptly noted, the term "fund" is somewhat vague and thus calls for an explanation.…”

Bringing Terrorists to Justice in the Context of Armed Conflict: Interaction between International Humanitarian Law and the UN Conventions Against Terrorism

“…Thus the Prosecution is required to prove not only that the Accused accepted the likelihood that terror would result from the illegal actsor, in other words, that he was aware of the possibility that terror would resultbut that that was the result which he specifically intended. The crime of terror is a specific-intent crime': Prosecutor v Galic, Trial Chamber Judgment (n 52) [136]. 56 intent or motivation.…”

“…For some authors, the effect of this provision is that 'the conduct, which is considered lawful under IHL, cannot be prohibited under ICSFT [International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing]'. 136 Are the acts listed by the Financing of Terrorism Convention considered lawful under IHL? It has already been noted that IHL prohibits acts of terrorism.…”