Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract. Chinese "aid" is a lightning rod for criticism. Policymakers, journalists, and public intellectuals claim that Beijing is using its largesse to cement alliances with political leaders, secure access to natural resources, and create exclusive commercial opportunities for Chinese firms-all at the expense of citizens living in developing countries. We argue that much of the controversy about Chinese "aid" stems from a failure to distinguish between China's Official Development Assistance (ODA) and more commercially-oriented sources and types of state financing. Using a new database on China's official financing commitments to Africa from 2000-2013, we find the allocation of Chinese ODA to be driven primarily by foreign policy considerations, while economic interests better explain the distribution of less concessional flows. Terms of use: Documents inThese results highlight the need for better measures of an increasingly diverse set of non-Western financial activities.

Does China's Overseas Lending Favor the One Belt One Road Countries?

“…1 Not surprisingly, China's official commitments are also found to be primarily driven by its foreign policy (Dreher & Duchs, 2016;Dreher et al, 2018). 2 China's overseas lending is mainly through its state-owned banks (Horn et al, 2019).…”

“…Second, studies relating to China's overseas lending (Dreher & Fuchs, 2016;Dreher et al, 2018;Hurley et al, 2019) often do not take "hidden debts" (i.e., undisclosed foreign official lending flows) into account. Zucman (2013) and Coppola et al (2019) argue that China's lending to developing countries involves offshore financial centers and/or borrowers' foreign banks, which make China's oversea loans hard to track.…”

Debunking Myths about China: The Determinants of China’s Official Financing to the Pacific

“…Taken together, it follows that Beijing has earned the dubious reputation of a 'rogue donor' as its financial assistance is seemingly guided by selfinterest instead of recipient need (Naím 2007; see also Bräutigam 2009). However, much of the controversy surrounding Beijing's development activities stems from a recurring issue in the literature on China's development finance, which is the tendency to lump the different types of state financing together under the label 'aid' (Brant 2013;Dreher et al 2018). In other words, following the work of Dreher et al (2018), it is expected that the different driversi.e.…”

“…China's growing role in the development landscape is a topic of increasing interest among academics, journalists, and policy-makers alike. The literature on China's development role in Africa, in particular, has proliferated rapidly in the last two decades (see, among others, Bräutigam 2009Bräutigam , 2011Dreher et al 2018). 1 This is perhaps unsurprising given that the majority of China's aid targets African states Smith 2017, 2333).…”

“…The main question this paper addresses reads as follows: What are the determinants of China's official financing to the Pacific Island Countries? In answering this research question, this study builds on a recent influential paper by Dreher et al (2018). In their paper, Dreher et al (2018) explore the determinants of Chinese state financing to African countries, differentiating between ODA and commercial-oriented flowsi.e.…”