This article accounts for Heidegger's phenomenological concept of violence from the period of Being and Time. Violence is relevant for Heidegger in two different contexts: (i) methodological, where we speak of hermeneutic violence, and (ii) thematic, where we should speak of existential violence. The former is grounded in the latter. In the first part of the article, I analyze hermeneutic violence, showing that this concept is ambiguous, and one has to distinguish between two different meanings of it. In the second part of the article, I show that at the core of the original sense lies the existential violence of bursting out of senselessness. In the final part, I contextualize Heidegger's concept in light of the contemporary phenomenological developments of the phenomenon of violence, showing that existential violence is constitutive and has the peculiar character of being at the same time sense-destroying and sense-making.The concept of violence from Heidegger's Being and Time period has rarely drawn attention to commentators. 1 There are some studies on Heidegger's Remus Breazu earned his PhD at the University of Bucharest in 2020 with a thesis entitled "The Reconstruction of the Concept of Transcendental in Edmund Husserl's and Martin Heidegger's Phenomenology." Currently he is a researcher at the Institute for Research in the Humanities, University of Bucharest. His main research interests are phenomenology, hermeneutics, and ancient Greek philosophy.