Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se Standard

Abstract

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Identifying the patterns: Towards a systematic approach to digital platform regulation

“…(3) Our synthesizing, case-based approach connects and extends prior contributions, which have either been rather conceptual (e.g., Gilbert, 2020) or focused on selected platforms only (e.g., Khan, 2017). At this, our findings emphasize the relevance of vertical and functional integration, allowing platform owners to orchestrate the system and compete with complementors at once (e.g., Dolata, 2017).…”

“…Especially, the formation of monopolies was object of many studies, for example, Didi Chuxing in the taxi market in China (Xing and Sharif, 2020). Other contributions focus on platforms in view of antitrust and emphasize the market dominance (Srinivasan, 2019a(Srinivasan, , 2019b or monopolies and critical digital infrastructures (Khan, 2017). Several contributions examine negative implications of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that impede innovation and competition (e.g., Katz, 2021;Kwon and Marco, 2021).…”

EU digital economy competition policy: From ex-post to ex-ante. The case of Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, and Meta

“…The second investigation addresses the e-retailer's advantage over how it collects and uses data of its buy box section. The third case, opened in late 2020, is on Amazon's dual platform advantages in the marketplace, distorting competition to its benefit at the expense of other sellers on its platform (see also Khan, 2017Khan, , 2018.…”

Three labour governance mechanisms for addressing decent work deficits in global value chains

“…A major and continuing challenge for GVC scholars has been to identify the causes of, and the solutions to, the systemic violations of fundamental workers' rights (Barrientos, Gereffi and Rossi 2011;ILO 2016b;Posthuma and Nathan 2010). As regards the causes, the persistent violations in GVCs have been linked to weak national governments (Locke 2013); under-funded labour inspectorates (ILO 2006); ineffective corporate monitoring practices (Esbenshade 2004); international outsourcing and the fissuring of work (Weil 2014); financialization (Appelbaum and Batt 2014); buyer consolidation via retailer mergers and acquisitions (Abernathy et al 1999); control by e-commerce firms over big data (Khan 2017); FTAs and a race to the bottom in labour standards (Chan 2003); and lead firm leveraging of growing geographic spaces of production (Dicken 2015).…”