Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth

DeAngelo, Harry; Rice, Edward M.

doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90016-8

Cited by 409 publications

(237 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

223

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Linn and McConnell (1983) studied the effects of anti-takeover amendments on the stock price and found positive but insignificant reactions to antitakeover amendments. DeAngelo and Rice (1983) investigated the same phenomenon and 20 In two tier tender offers, acquirers offer a higher price for the first 51% of the shares tendered, and a lower price for the remaining 49% that are not. By doing so, they hope to increase the number of stockholders who do tender.…”

Section: * (Market Value Of Restructured Firm-market Value Of Firm Asmentioning

confidence: 94%

Acquisitions and Takeovers

Damodaran

2008

Handbook of Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: * (Market Value Of Restructured Firm-market Value Of Firm Asmentioning

confidence: 94%

Acquisitions and Takeovers

Damodaran

2008

Handbook of Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…In many countries the legal structures of corporate law protecting companies from hostile takeovers have been widely criticized (43)(44)(45), and regulations have come into effect changing corporate law to give shareholders the power to have anti-takeover measures rescinded under certain conditions (e.g., the 13th Directive 2004/25/ EC on takeover bids). Regulators and companies also have been pressured to abandon the two-tier structure, common in large corporations with continental European legal roots [Rhine Capitalism; see Albert (46)], under which shareholders cannot appoint or dismiss the board, and to move to the Anglo-Saxon one-tier structure that grants shareholders those powers (47,48).…”

Section: Increased Power For Shareholdersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy systems transformation

Dangerman

Schellnhuber

2013

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The contemporary industrial metabolism is not sustainable. Critical problems arise at both the input and the output side of the complex: Although affordable fossil fuels and mineral resources are declining, the waste products of the current production and consumption schemes (especially CO 2 emissions, particulate air pollution, and radioactive residua) cause increasing environmental and social costs. Most challenges are associated with the incumbent energy economy that is unlikely to subsist. However, the crucial question is whether a swift transition to its sustainable alternative, based on renewable sources, can be achieved. The answer requires a deep analysis of the structural conditions responsible for the rigidity of the fossil-nuclear energy system. We argue that the resilience of the fossil-nuclear energy system results mainly from a dynamic lock-in pattern known in operations research as the "Success to the Successful" mode. The present way of generating, distributing, and consuming energy-the largest business on Earth-expands through a combination of factors such as the longevity of pertinent infrastructure, the information technology revolution, the growth of the global population, and even the recent financial crises: Renewable-energy industries evidently suffer more than the conventional-energy industries under recession conditions. Our study tries to elucidate the archetypical traits of the lock-in pattern and to assess the respective importance of the factors involved. In particular, we identify modern corporate law as a crucial system element that thus far has been largely ignored. Our analysis indicates that the rigidity of the existing energy economy would be reduced considerably by the assignment of unlimited liabilities to the shareholders."Whoever has in his hand, to him will be given and whoever has not, even the little he has, will be taken from him." -The Gospel of Thomas, Logos 41.* T he incumbent energy system generates a number of negative effects, many of which disturb the climate and threaten the ecosystems on which we depend. Although those effects have been known for several decades, and although sustainability is a widely held aspiration, there has been no real mitigation of the most pertinent causes: the generation and use of conventional energy sources. In fact, although the combined share of fossil and nuclear resources in the world's total supply of primary energy has remained stable since 1973, the absolute supply of these resources has more than doubled. In parallel with this increase, shareholders' power in the realm of corporate governance has increased significantly.This paper discusses and characterizes the structural mechanisms behind the rigidity of the contemporary energy system and considers the role of corporate law in this context. It concludes with a suggestion for a change in the structure of corporate law that may help reduce our energy system's addiction to fossil energy resources and the negative side-effects of this addiction. Problems Caused by the Current E...

show abstract

“…There are several prior studies on the shareholder wealth effects of anti-takeover actions for more random samples of firms that are not necessarily subject to an MBO offer (see DeAngelo and Rice, 1983;Linn and McConnell, 1983;Dann and DeAngelo, 1988;Maletesta and Walking, 1988;Ryngaert, 1988;Poulsen, 1987, 1988;Karpoff and Maletesta, 1989;McWilliams, 1990;Brickley, Coles, and Terry, 1994;Comment and Schwert, 1995;and McWilliams and Sen, 1997). The "management entrenchment hypothesis" would be associated with a negative stock price reaction to the announcement of anti-takeover actions, whereas the "bargaining hypothesis" would be associated with a positive stock price reaction.…”

Section: Hypothesis Development and Previous Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%