“…Per this perspective, as long as the defining features of a social dilemma are maintained and free-riding remains in the individual's best interest, neither the public good's efficiency nor its (in)equality in returns should matter (R. M. Dawes, 1980;van Dijk & De Dreu, 2021). This conjecture contrasts with empirical findings that cooperation is common and frequent, even when it comes at a potential cost to individual interests (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994;Lojowska et al, 2023;Ostrom, 1998;Rand & Nowak, 2013;van Dijk & De Dreu, 2021;Van Lange, 1999;van Vugt & Hardy, 2009;Weber & Murnighan, 2008). In addition, experiments have revealed that larger rather than smaller returns from public goods (i.e., efficiency) further boost such cooperation (e.g., Engelmann & Strobel, 2004;Gunnthorsdottir et al, 2007;Isaac & Walker, 1998;Lugovskyy et al, 2017;Rapoport, 1967;Reuben & Riedl, 2013;van den Berg et al, 2020;Vlaev & Chater, 2006;C.…”