Anti-Normativism Evaluated

Hlobil, Ulf

doi:10.1080/09672559.2015.1042398

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…One of the advantages of this argument is that it does not presuppose any specific conception of norms in force for PAs. Whether such norms are conceived as deontic or evaluative (Fassio 2011, McHugh 2012, first-personal or third-personal (Hlobil 2015), as long as PAAJs are normative judgments, this argument works well.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 83%

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Propositional Attitudes as Commitments: Unleashing Some Constraints

Kazemi

2020

Dialogue

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In a series of articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositional attitude (PA) ascription judgements do not behave like normative judgements in being subject to a priori normative supervenience and the Because Constraint, PAs cannot be constitutively normative.1 I argue that, for a specific version of normativism, according to which PAs are normative commitments, these arguments fail. To this end, I argue that commitments and obligations should be distinguished. Then, I show that the intuitions allegedly governing all normative judgements do not even purport to hold for commitment-attributing judgements.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 83%

“… 5 For evaluative conceptions of mental normativism, see Fassio (2011) and McHugh (2012). For a third-personal conception, see Hlobil (2015). …”

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confidence: 99%

Propositional Attitudes as Commitments: Unleashing Some Constraints

Kazemi

2020

Dialogue

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“…In the past several years, some authors (Hlobil, 2015;Kiesselbach, 2014Kiesselbach, , 2020Peregrin, 2012) have emphasised that it is crucial to understand the normative aspect of linguistic meaning in terms of assessment. It has been claimed that rules of language are rules that do not tell us what we ought to do; rather, they say what we may do (or should not do), and our actions are assessed by other members of the relevant linguistic community in the light of the rules constitutive of the practice.…”

Section: Consent and Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rules, practices, and assessment of linguistic behaviour

Kaluziński

2023

Theoria

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In this paper, I focus on the idea that language is a rule‐constituted and rule‐governed practice. This notion has been criticised recently. It has been claimed that, even if linguistic meaning is determined by rules, these rules are not genuinely normative because they do not govern actions within the practice by themselves. It has been emphasised that one needs to consent (e.g., has relevant intention or desire) to be a part of that practice. First, I distinguish between two issues: (1) How do rules come to life? (and the answer to that question is by enactment or communal acceptance), and (2) does being assessed by the standards set by the rules require some form of consent for one's actions to be evaluated by these standards? Then, I demonstrate how, by introducing the notion of “default normativity”, one can defend the idea that there are normative practices that are constituted and governed by rules and that language is one of them.

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“…Many ENMC defenders support the claim by appealing to putative rules for belief-formation, i.e., theoretical judgment. Content facts imply rules for what the content's possessor ought/not judge 1 Examples include Boghossian (2003Boghossian ( , 2005, Brandom (1994), Bridges (2011), Ginsborg (2012), Hlobil (2015), Morris (1992), and Verdejo (2014). Gibbard's position qualifies, given his expressivist standards for essential prescriptive normativity (2003; 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content

Green

2020

Acta Anal

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Mental content normativists hold that the mind's conceptual contents are essentially normative. Many hold the view because they think facts of the form 'subject S possesses concept C' imply that S is enjoined (i.e., bound or genuinely obligated) by rules concerning the application of C in theoretical judgments. Some opponents independently raise an intuitive objection: even if there are such rules, S's possession of the concept is not the source of the enjoinment. Hence these rules do not support mental content normativism. Call this the 'Source Objection'. This paper refutes the Source Objection, outlining a key strand of the relationship between judgments and their contents in the process. Theoretical judgment and mental conceptual content are equally the source of enjoinment; norms for judging with contents do not derive from one at the expense of the other.

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Anti-Normativism Evaluated

Cited by 12 publications

References 27 publications

Propositional Attitudes as Commitments: Unleashing Some Constraints

Propositional Attitudes as Commitments: Unleashing Some Constraints

Rules, practices, and assessment of linguistic behaviour

Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content

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