Anti-intellectualist motor knowledge

Ferretti, G.

doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02750-9

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 73 publications

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“…Several scholars have expressed doubts about invoking the notion of practical mode, arguing that this notion is too vaguely introduced (Levy, 2015;Noë, 2005), or contending that it is not a viable route to explain how knowledge guides action (Dickie, 2012;Ferretti, 2020;Fridland, 2013;Glick, 2013).…”

Section: Practical Modes and The Selection-prescription Issuementioning

confidence: 99%

On knowledge in action

Ferretti

Caiani

2023

Theory & Psychology

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What mental states guide the execution of our actions? It is generally agreed that the execution of an action is guided by the relevant knowledge state concerning how to perform that action. However, not all agree on which mental states underlie such a knowledge. Some suggest that knowing how to perform an action has mainly to do with the propositional representation about the way to execute that action. Those opposing this view stress the role of the motor, non-propositional representation as the mental state responsible for action performance. The aim of this article is to overcome this dichotomy by showing that an explanation of the cognitive processes underlying knowing how to perform an action needs both propositional and motor states. We defend this view by providing an account of the way in which our propositional knowledge about an action is constituted by the motor representation that guides the execution of that action.

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Section: Practical Modes and The Selection-prescription Issuementioning

confidence: 99%

On knowledge in action

Ferretti

Caiani

2023

Theory & Psychology

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“…25. Something that might be thought to be more promising here would be the idea that conscious ventral representations contribute to types of action that are not yet skilled or performed with automaticity (e.g., Ferretti, 2021b), an idea that is in kinship with Briscoe and Schwenkler's Control Thesis, which holds that conscious ventral information is required for actions that are "complicated, delicate, or unfamiliar" (2015:1438).…”

Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conscious vision guides motor action—rarely

Kozuch

2022

Philosophical Psychology

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According to Milner and Goodale's dual visual systems (DVS) theory, a division obtains between visual consciousness and motor action, in that the visual system producing conscious vision (the ventral stream) is distinct from the one guiding action (the dorsal stream). That there would be this division is often taken (by Andy Clark and others) to undermine the folk view on how consciousness and action relate. However, even if this division obtains, this leaves open the possibility that conscious ventral information is often transmitted to the unconscious dorsal stream and then used to guide action, a possibility seeming to preserve a significant role for consciousness in action. This article assesses this possibility. In course of doing so, we will review those arguments recently having been made against the DVS view on how visual consciousness and action relate (ones due to, e.g., Briscoe and Schwenkler, or Schenk and McIntosh). What we will find is that, if we properly analyze the data upon which these arguments are based, we are still left with the impression that the DVS view is largely correct; i.e., it is only rarely that visual experience guides action.

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“…This means that what is called sensorimotor understanding has to be properly attuned to the surface (Ferretti 2021b). When we cannot track the surface successfully, our visual system will be capable of deriving spatial shifts with respect to the pictorial space, as it happens with anamorphic paintings and trompe l'oeils (Ferretti 2020b). Even in these cases, we have a partial or complete breakdown of usual pictorial experience and its typical visual characteristics (Ferretti 2021b).…”

Section: Action and Ordinary Pictorial Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Philosophical discussion and/of experimental results from visual and motor neuroscience suggested that vision and action are deeply related in several manners. 7 And this is true even for visual processing related to pictorial experience (Ferretti 2016c;2018a;2020b;2021b). Now, the field of neuroaesthetics has recently offered experimental results that can tell us something important about aesthetic appreciation (Di Dio, Gallese 2009;Jacobsen et al 2006;.…”

Section: Motoric Aesthetic Appreciationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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2 | 1 | 2021 Image/Images: A Debate Between Philosophy and Visual Studies

2021

Jolma

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pany their gestures. On the other hand, whirling characterizes the scribbles that Benjamin himself sketched during a series of experiments with drugs conducted under the guidance of Dr. Fritz Fränkel. The spiral then becomes the sign of the sinking of the logos into the depths of the unconscious. Both cases are evoked by Didi-Huberman to allude to the indeterminacy that characterizes the margins of language as well as those of figuration: is a whirlpool an image or not? Jesse Prinz, in his "Realism Relativized: A Cultural-Historical Approach to What Images Capture", offers a fascinating journey into both western and non-western artistic tradition to expand the survey around the concept of pictorial realism. What does it mean that an Italian Renaissance painting or a Japanese ukiyo-e print are realistic? Are we talking about the same kind of realism? And does it make sense to compare the two types of realism or even to draw a rule that lumps them together under the same definition? After examining (and rejecting) two distinct groups of philosophical theories -those that emphasize perceptual processing and those that define realism in terms of informativeness -Prinz proposes his own alternative account of pictorial realism. The MCA analysis (an acronym standing for manners, capture and aspects) describes what aspects of reality an artwork or a style capture, and in what manner they capture these aspects. Given these premises, the MCA solution is necessarily relative to a specific historical, cultural and social context, so the philosophical analysis must proceed in concert with art history investigation.In her "On the Narrative Potential of Depiction", Katerina Bantinaki argues against skeptical positions that depreciate the narrative potential of monophase pictures. She identifies two main strands of skepticism. The first one derives from Lessing's Laocoön: static pictures are related to space and not to time, so they cannot represent actions. According to this account, any sense of temporality emerging from the picture is not really perceived but depends on our imagination or interpretation. The second one claims that monophase pictures have to be excluded from the realm of narratives because they cannot express causal relations between temporally ordered events of which a story is composed. While the first strand of skepticism has been brilliantly faced in many ways -for example, emotions facially expressed by the characters in a painting lead unambiguously to the recognition of a specific action -the second strand is more thorny. In order to tackle this last position, Bantinaki argues that (i) the concept of 'causal relation' itself needs to be better defined, and that (ii) in this case empathy plays a fundamental role. For what concerns the second point, looking at a picture, gestures, gaze directions and facial expressions can activate the viewer's life experience in order to recover the causal relations between depicted characters and events. From this perspective, causal relations are not an imag-

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Anti-intellectualist motor knowledge

Cited by 11 publications

References 73 publications

On knowledge in action

On knowledge in action

Conscious vision guides motor action—rarely

2 | 1 | 2021 Image/Images: A Debate Between Philosophy and Visual Studies

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