Another “strategic accession”? The EU and Serbia (2000–2010)

Abstract

The South-eastern enlargement currently suffers from defections, compliance problems and blockades; the results of the European Union's policy since 1999 can be called mixed at best. The “Serbian question” – for instance – remains unsolved since Serbia still means a “problem child” of the international community. The thesis generated in this paper is that all of these problems are indicators of a basic identity conflict. This conflict stems from entirely different identities, i.e. world views, perception of the state, political cultures and the meaning of international politics. The EU's enlargement policy – in its ideal type – is precisely meant to overcome this conflict by “Europeanizing” the acceding states. Yet the argument here is that the EU also pursues goals beyond Europeanization – for instance “stabilization” – hence the EU might be interested in accessions despite the fact that the Copenhagen criteria have not been fulfilled. Such “strategic accessions”, as experienced with Romania, Greece and Cyprus, tend to hinder the EU's external governance and foster enlargement fatigue in the long run. The case of Serbia serves as an example for demonstrating that Serbia is not complying with the basic standards of EU integration and that the EU is not really enforcing compliance. As a result, we are heading towards a “strategic accession” in the Serbian case.

Emotions and Identity as Foreign Policy Determinants: Serbian Approach to Relations with Russia

“…Moreover, researchers argue that the Serbian political elite mostly share the negative perception toward the alliance and, similarly to the Serbian public, treat it as an identity issue (e.g. Subotić 2011;Stahl 2013). The same seems to hold for Serbian intellectuals: even liberal scholar Vojin Dimitrijević calls the bombings "unreasonable", for they exacerbated the already widespread anti-Western sentiments in Serbia (2009, p. 44).…”

“…In this vein, scholars argue that Serbia and the EU have "entirely different identities, i.e. world views, perception of the state, political cultures and the meaning of international politics", characterising the country as a "problem child" of EU integration, stating that Serbia's accession to the bloc is "strategic" (Stahl 2013, p. 447), that is, the country technically adheres to all EU requirements, simultaneously undergoing no normative shift (Stahl 2013;Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015). Both at the societal and elite levels, Serbia is arguably driven chiefly by short-term interests, a trend manifesting itself in voting behaviour (Schimmelfennig et al 2006, p. 94), public opinion surveys (Wohlfeld 2015, p. 5) and elite approach to foreign policy (ibid, p. 1).…”

“…Yet, researchers widely describe Serbia's EU ambitions as instrumental, pragmatic and originated not in internalisation of European values, but in a mere desire to receive material benefits from the bloc (e.g. Subotić 2011;Stahl 2013;Radeljić 2014;Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015). As one study notes, Serbs' support of EU integration "relies mostly on the assumption that merely joining brings great economic advantages, yet that great social or mental adjustments are supposedly not required to achieve this" (Dimitrijević 2009, p. 44).…”

Conditions and effects of environmental legislation changes: Twenty years from the beginning of the Europeanization process in the Republic of Serbia

“…However, the complexity of the RS status in the international community keeps on being one of the questions that cannot be ignored. Stahl points to the co-operation with the International Tribunal for War Crimes Committed in the Territory of former SFRY and the relationship to Kosovo (Stahl, 2013). In the period after 2000, the GDP/pc grew in the range from 914.7 US$ (in 2000), when it was at its lowest level) to 3,720 US$ (2005), 7,101 US$ (2008) and 5,735 US$ (2010).…”