Another Christian right? The politicization of Korean Protestantism in contemporary global society

Abstract

The author explores the political rise of conservative Protestantism in the larger context of Protestant Christianity’s reconfiguration in Korea. The incorporation of East Asia into the modern world resulted not only in the failure to establish a single Korean state, but also in the rise of the category ‘religion’ in this region. The remarkable growth of Korean Protestantism was, in large part, due to its great contribution, as a model religion, to the building of Korea as a modern nation. Since the late 1980s, however, the public has lost confidence in it and there has been a rise in discourses of nation re-building that give great emphasis to indigenous cultures and regional resources. Meanwhile, Protestant Churches have emerged as a key opponent to nationalist aspirations and programmes for social reform. The re-politicization of Protestantism in post-Cold War South Korea reflects the extent of the insecurity stemming from of Korea’s shifting place in a newly globalized East Asia. Religion makes the re-entry of Korea into the late-modern world at once dynamic and unpredictable.

Two sacred tales in the Seoul metropolis: The gospels of prosperity and development in modernizing South Korea

“…With his recent conservative turn, Kim is no longer remembered as a ‘little Jesus of the slum’ by his former colleagues and followers. He is now more known as a leading advocate of the so-called ‘New Right’ movement that supports neoliberal reforms and global capitalism (Cho, 2014; Ryu, 2009).…”

Religious aspirations among urban Christians in contemporary Indonesia

“…In addition, the call to instill ‘Christian values’ in education also concerns the preservation of family values and the institution of marriage, which reflects much of the political debate in the United States. The anti-gay and pro-family discourse from the Christian Right in America has been globalized to several Asian nations where evangelical and fundamentalist Christianity have established considerable social and political influence (see Cho, 2014; Chong, 2011; Wong, 2013). While the same notion of a ‘Christian Right’ is still virtually unheard of in Indonesia, the attitudes of Pentecostal and evangelical churches towards issues of family and sexuality resemble similar moral conservatism, usually expressed by way of moral panic, such as ‘our family values and God’s design for the institution of marriage have been under attack!’ (interview, 2 February 2014).…”

“…Moreover, many Indonesian Pentecostal leaders look to the ‘Korean model’ for inspiration in church growth and economic development. Indeed, Protestant Christianity has played an indispensable role in developing South Korea’s economy and civil society (Cho, 2014; Kim, 2014). To many Koreans, Christianity is considered to be synonymous with modernity so that ‘conversion to Protestantism represented an effective method of becoming a modern individual’ (Cho, 2014: 316).…”

“…Indeed, Protestant Christianity has played an indispensable role in developing South Korea’s economy and civil society (Cho, 2014; Kim, 2014). To many Koreans, Christianity is considered to be synonymous with modernity so that ‘conversion to Protestantism represented an effective method of becoming a modern individual’ (Cho, 2014: 316). 11 During the period of industrialization and urbanization, Pentecostal churches such as the Yoido Full Gospel Church provided a potent resource and direction for rural migrants, impoverished populations who were at the margins of development, and those who found themselves lost amid such rapid socioeconomic transformations (Cho, 2014).…”

Glocalization of “Christian Social Responsibility”: The Contested Legacy of the Lausanne Movement among Neo-Evangelicals in South Korea1

“…On the one side is a group of right-leaning neo-evangelical leaders of the older Korean War generation [3], who introduced the Lausanne movement into South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s and who, from then on, championed the gradual reform-oriented civic movement in competition with both reactionary conservatives and radical progressives. In 2004, they launched a new right-leaning civil organization, Kidokkyo sahoe ch'aegim (Christian social responsibility (CSR)) and more or less aligned themselves with conservative forces to suppress the ascendance of the liberal-left force in the public sphere [4,5]. On the other side is a group of neo-evangelical activists of the younger 1980s democratic movement generation [6].…”