Anonymous Trusted Data Relocation for TEEs

Guita, Vasco; Andrade, Daniel; Silva, João Nuno; Correia, Miguel

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-06975-8_26

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Very recently, Chen et al [13] proposed an IB-ME scheme with small parameters by a variant of two-level anonymous IBE, which was based on the static assumptions and built in the standard model. Guita et al [28] applied the idea of IB-ME to trusted relocation extension service, which allows relocating confidential data in a non-interactive and anonymous manner.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Revocable identity‐based matchmaking encryption in the standard model

Jiang

Wang

Zhang

et al. 2023

IET Information Security

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Identity-based Matchmaking Encryption (IB-ME) is an extension notion of matchmaking encryption (CRYPTO 2019), where a sender and a receiver can specify an access policy for the other party. In IB-ME, data encryption is performed by not only a receiver identity but also a sender's encryption key. Nevertheless, previous IB-ME schemes have not considered the problem of efficient revocation. Hence, the authors introduce a new notion of revocable IB-ME (RIB-ME) and formalise the syntax and security model of RIB-ME. In particular, the authors give an effective and simple construction of RIB-ME in the standard model, whose security is reduced to the hardness of decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem and computational Diffie-Hellman problem. In addition, the authors show two extensions of our RIB-ME scheme to consider chosen-ciphertext security and forward privacy. K E Y W O R D S cryptography, public key cryptography 1 | INTRODUCTION Matchmaking Encryption: At CRYPTO 2019, Ateniese et al. [1,2] proposed the notion of matchmaking encryption (ME), which provides privacy-preserving policy matching over both the sender and receiver. In particular, sender S and receiver R can both specify policies that the other party must satisfy in order for the message to be revealed. In particular, S described by σ encrypts a message m under a specified policy R, and produces a corresponding ciphertext CT that associates with both σ and R. By also specifying a policy S that S should satisfy, R described by ρ uses its decryption key that is related to ρ to reveal the encrypted message from his target sender S. Thus, we have � If R cannot decrypt CT, it is a "mismatch case". This implies that either S is not accepted by R's policy (i.e., SðσÞ ¼ 0) or R is not accepted by S's policy (i.e., RðρÞ ¼ 0).� If R can decrypt CT, it is a "match case". This implies that both S is accepted by R's policy (i.e., SðσÞ ¼ 1), and R is accepted by S's policy (i.e., RðρÞ ¼ 1).

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Guita et al. [28] applied the idea of IB‐ME to trusted relocation extension service, which allows relocating confidential data in a non‐interactive and anonymous manner.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%