Anonymous rituals

Abstract

a b s t r a c tSome social institutions reveal participants' behavior in the aggregate, while concealing the identities of the participants. For example, individual church donations may be kept anonymous, while the total amount raised is publicized. This presents a puzzle in light of recent evidence that anonymity reduces contributions. We offer an explanation for this puzzle in the context of a model of costly signaling with two types of agents: conditionally cooperative ("good") and uncooperative ("bad"). We consider costly participation in a community activity (e.g., tithing) as a signal of an individual's type. By signaling the presence of one more good type, this may lead other good types to contribute more in future, more important, collective goods problems (CGP's). Thus, if good types also value others' contributions more than bad types, good types gain more from sending the signal. But if those who do not signal face exclusion, the signal would need to be made very costly to dissuade bad types from signaling. In contrast, if the institution is anonymous, so that it reveals only the total number of signals, then while signals cannot be used to exclude bad types, even an inexpensive signal may succeed in revealing the total number of good types. This information helps good types maximize the conditional cooperation component of their utility in the CGP, and under specified conditions, can increase expected CGP contributions. We characterize conditions under which an anonymous signaling institution increases expected welfare.We provide examples of institutions that may yield such benefits, including religion, music and dance, voting, charitable donations, and military traditions.

Moral cleansing as hypocrisy: When private acts of charity make you feel better than you deserve.

“…Because morality is a core part of many people’s self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Steele, 1988), people are willing to make substantial sacrifices to feel virtuous (Andreoni, 1988, 1990; Batson et al, 1989, 1988). For example, they will make anonymous donations to feel generous (Hugh-Jones & Reinstein, 2012; Karlan & List, 2007), or forgo lucrative cheating opportunities to avoid feeling like a cheater (Abeler, Nosenzo, & Raymond, 2019; Bryan, Adams, & Monin, 2013; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). In short, feeling virtuous is a valuable resource that normally must be earned through costly or effortful behavior.…”

The Identified Donor Effect: Disclosure of the Donor’s Name Shapes the Recipient’s Behavior

“…Whether or not to remain anonymous when making charitable donations is of interest to donors, charities, and researchers. Thus far, the literature on donor name disclosure has focused mainly on the consequences of disclosing the donor’s name to the charities or their own social networks (Glazer & Konrad, 1996; Hugh‐Jones & Reinstein, 2012; Peacey & Sanders, 2014; Schervish, 1994; Soetevent, 2005; Winterich, Mittal, & Aquino, 2013). From these perspectives, the existing literature has identified both benefits and costs.…”

“…Anonymity can also help donors protect their privacy, maintain a low public profile, and avoid excessive solicitations from charities in the future (Schervish, 1994). Finally, from the charity’s perspective, the ability to attract anonymous donations serves as evidence of the charity’s quality and reputation (Hugh‐Jones & Reinstein, 2012; Peacey & Sanders, 2014).…”