Animals Would Follow ShāfiʿIsm: Legitimate and Illegitimate Violence to Animals in Medieval Islamic Thought

Abstract

The fact that Islam allows humans to consume meat and obtain several services from nonhuman animals is prevalently interpreted as a sign of anthropocentrism. For example, G. H. Bousquet considers that God created other animals to serve humans, thus suggesting that nonhuman animals have little or no intrinsic value in Islam.1 Carol Bakhos, Mohammed Hocine Benkheira and many others subscribe to the same opinion.2 The aim of this chapter is not to contest this view altogether, but to argue that the supposed anthropocentric character of Islamic tradition has been overemphasised at the expense of the theocentric one. Anthropocentrism is, of course, a ‘sin’, of which all human societies seem to be guilty. Nevertheless, to the extent that one can discern from medieval Islamic texts, the anthropocentric tendencies of pre-modern Muslim societies were often held in check by the equally, if not more important, theocentric character of the tradition. This approach resulted in genuine respect and serious engagement with nonhuman animals’ interests. The question of legitimate and illegitimate violence is well situated to illustrate this point. Thus, as I investigate how some Muslim scholars justified and categorised acts of force against animals, I will also assess the extent to which anthropocentric presuppositions shaped Muslims’ attitudes toward other animals.

God’s Justice and Animal Welfare

“…In this work she examined the status and nature of animals in the Qurʾān and in exegetical works and has challenged the prevalent view of man's superiority over animals by suggesting new ways of interpreting the Qurʾān. Since this publication, Tlili has contributed significantly with articles (Tlili 2014b(Tlili , 2015(Tlili , 2018a(Tlili , 2018b) and participation at conferences towards understanding the status of animals in the Islamic tradition.…”

Islamic Bioethics and Animal Research: The Case of Iran

“…Pigs, forbidden for food in the Qur'an, are considered religious‐legally impure like dogs. Likewise, there are hadith which claim that Muhammad allowed for the killing of certain animals without penalty or concern, including certain snakes, scorpions, mice, rats, crows, kites, and mad dogs (Tlili , 227). Similar hadith are found in the Shiite collections as well (see for example al‐Kulaynī , 4.363).…”

Avicenna on Animal Goods

“…As is well known, Islamic legal theory extensively considered the rights of animals and the care to which they were entitled (cf. Tlili 2015). The takeaway here is that Avicenna saw both the lawgiver responsible for human moral pronouncements and the specific goods of animals as part of one and the same order of divine teleology.…”

“…Falling under the umbrella of philosophy are texts and thinkers of three disciplines: falsafa or Greek-influenced philosophy, fiqh or jurisprudence, and kalām or theology. The theological debates covered by contemporary scholarship include the long-appreciated Muʿtazilī concern for animal suffering (as in the case of ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/ 1024), in Heemskerk 2000; and in varieties of commentaries on the Qurʾān in Tlili 2012), and recent scholarship on animal well-being within jurisprudence includes the positions of the different schools of jurisprudence on the treatment of animals (according to which Shāfiʿism is most benevolent; Tlili 2015). Within philosophy, scholarship has been broadly limited to the examples of Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 313/925 or 323/935), the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ (fl.…”