Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts

Newen, Albert; Bartels, Andreas

doi:10.1080/09515080701358096

Cited by 70 publications

(62 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…In monkeys, activity that is informative about visual category boundaries has been reported in multiple regions of parietal and prefrontal cortex, including the lateral intraparietal area (Freedman and Assad, 2006), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Freedman et al, 2001), inferotemporal cortex (Freedman et al, 2003), and frontal eye field (Ferrera et al, 2009) (for review, see Freedman andAssad, 2016). Similar regions in prefrontal and inferotemporal cortex contain neurons that respond selectively when monkeys engage in tasks that require explicit or implicit ordering of visual images (Miyashita, 1988;Berdyyeva and Olson, 2010;Brunamonti et al, 2016).…”

Section: Neural Substrates Of Categorization and Serial Ordermentioning

confidence: 99%

Inferential Learning of Serial Order of Perceptual Categories by Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

et al. 2017

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Category learning in animals is typically trained explicitly, in most instances by varying the exemplars of a single category in a matchingto-sample task. Here, we show that male rhesus macaques can learn categories by a transitive inference paradigm in which novel exemplars of five categories were presented throughout training. Instead of requiring decisions about a constant set of repetitively presented stimuli, we studied the macaque's ability to determine the relative order of multiple exemplars of particular stimuli that were rarely repeated. Ordinal decisions generalized both to novel stimuli and, as a consequence, to novel pairings. Thus, we showed that rhesus monkeys could learn to categorize on the basis of implied ordinal position, without prior matching-to-sample training, and that they could then make inferences about category order. Our results challenge the plausibility of association models of category learning and broaden the scope of the transitive inference paradigm.

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Section: Neural Substrates Of Categorization and Serial Ordermentioning

confidence: 99%

Inferential Learning of Serial Order of Perceptual Categories by Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

et al. 2017

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“…In addition, the story occurs in many published works within the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of cognition (e.g. Brooks, 2002;Carruthers, 2004;Double, 1988;Elton, 2003;Fogel, 2000;Franklin, 1995;Millikan, 2004;Newen & Bartels, 2007;Newman, 2001;Stephan, 1999;Sterelny, 1990).…”

Section: Antisphexishness)mentioning

confidence: 99%

TheSphexstory: How the cognitive sciences kept repeating an old and questionable anecdote

Keijzer¹

2013

Philosophical Psychology

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“…Albert Newen and Andreas Bartels (2007) cite the parrot Alex (Pepperberg 1999) and the bonobo Kanzi (Savage-Rumbaugh et al 1998). If one complains that these are case studies rather than controlled experiments, or that they involve linguistically enculturated agents who have developed some limited capacity for human language, then one can turn to the studies of scrub jays (Clayton, Dickinson 1998;Raby et al 2007) and ravens (Bugnyar, Kotrschal 2002) who, through a series of carefully controlled experiments, show sophisticated fl exibility in their caching habits.…”

Section: Conceptual Origins In the Speciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual change and development on multiple time scales: From incremental evolution to origins

Parthemore¹

2014

SSS

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Abstract. In the context of the relationship between signs and concepts, this paper tackles some of the ongoing controversies over conceptual development and change -including the claim by some that concepts are not open to revision at alltaking the position that concepts pull apart from language and that concepts can be discussed on at least four levels: that of individual agent, community, society, and language. More controversially, it claims that concepts are not just inherently open to revision but that they, and the frameworks of which they form part, are in a state of continuous, if generally incremental, change: a position that derives directly from the enactive tradition in philosophy. Concepts, to be effective as concepts, must strike a careful balance between being stable enough to apply across suitably many contexts and flexible enough to adapt to each new context. The paper's contribution is a comparison and contrast of conceptual development and change on four time scales: that of the day-to-day life of an individual conceptual agent, the day-to-day life of society, the lifetime of an individual agent, and the lifetime of society and the human species itself. It concludes that the relationship between concepts and experience (individual or collective) is one of circular and not linear causality.

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Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts

Cited by 70 publications

References 23 publications

Inferential Learning of Serial Order of Perceptual Categories by Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

Inferential Learning of Serial Order of Perceptual Categories by Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

TheSphexstory: How the cognitive sciences kept repeating an old and questionable anecdote

Conceptual change and development on multiple time scales: From incremental evolution to origins

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