Animal Ethics and the Autonomous Animal Self

Where horses run free? Autonomy, temporality and rewilding in the Côa Valley, Portugal

“…As some scholars have observed, however, the invocation of “autonomy” for non‐human others can often seem to be motivated more by a desire to atone for human interference than by an appreciation of “the fullest expression of animal life, including the capacity for movement, for social and familial association, for work and play” (Collard, Dempsey, & Sundberg, , p. 328). Such a focus on self‐expression suggests that autonomy might be more productively defined as the freedom to act, rather than the absence of control (Thomas, ). There remains a clear need for research that examines how autonomy is pursued and achieved in specific conservation contents, and that investigates the relationship between autonomy and states of relative “wildness” (Castree, , p. 376).…”

“…For Thomas while all animals have the capacity to act, the ability to act intentionally (and freely) is, “in general and morally (…) a matter of degree rather than of kind” (, p. 34). As such, the consideration given to animal others is about understanding that “just as there are both rich and basic levels of self, so too there are rich and basic levels of autonomy” (, p. 77). The respect of the other as a self‐aware, autonomous being assumes a moral obligation:…”

“…As Hinchliffe has pointed out, Kant's assertion of human “autonomy” as an achievement related to progress, modernity and the urban – as distinct from “heteronomy,” and its association with pre‐modernity (Hinchliffe, , p. 42; see also Thomas, ; Rasmussen, ) – introduces a central temporal orientation to the question of autonomy. In this framework, which is implied in Jørgensen's critique, animal autonomy is a state that existed prior to the assertion of human autonomy – the “wild” is thought to be located in the past, when there were “more animals and less people (or at least, much less intrusive people)” (, p. 487; see also Castree, , p. 297).…”

“…The interim arrangements in place for fencing and watering the reintroduced horses speak directly to the issue of autonomy. But rather than applying the binary of autonomous/non‐autonomous, the fencing and feeding of the Garrano horses is more appropriately understood with the arguments put forth by Thomas () in reference to establishing degrees of autonomy, as well as considering how these degrees correlate with Braverman's () discussions of ex situ and in situ conservation. In this circumstance, if the horses are fenced in order to be contained, then would they be considered in the same vein as ex situ conservation subjects, such as captive animals in zoos?…”

Bioethical Considerations of Advancing the Application of Marine Biotechnology and Aquaculture

“…Clearly autonomy is a human construct as humans, to our current level of understanding, are the only animal that can meet these particular criteria; especially the components of cognitive understanding and meaningful choices. While this is somewhat disputed with studies of the higher primates and certain species such as dolphins under confinement choice experiments, it is not clear if those animals are responding to cognitive reasoning, or they are expressing learned responses [ 42 , 43 , 44 ].…”