Anglo—French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18

Why the British Were Really on the Somme: A Reply to Elizabeth Greenhalgh

“…In practice no pre-war decision was made between`a limited independent ªnorthern¯ankº commitment or a potentially unlimited continental alliance strategy'. 21 Any possibility that after war broke out Britain could pursue an independent line in policy, strategy and operations was surrendered when Britain decided to dispatch her small regular army to France, and speci® cally to the French left wing, in August 1914 ± as Haig acknowledged,`our best policy at the present time was to do as the French wished us'. 22 Had this military strategy contributed to the quick decisive defeat of Germany that Henry Wilson and other`short war delusionists' anticipated, 23 then Britain's great power status would have been maintained at minimum cost ± her policy of supporting France against German aggression, belatedly reconciled with an`alliance' military strategy, would have paid off.…”

“…Although it would reduce his offensive strength, to husband his forces for the summer offensive Haig reluctantly opted to extend the British line. 109 More generally, Haig's growing anxiety about the French army's morale, obviously shaken by Verdun, became a factor in his calculations over the ensuing four months of preparation. He was obliged to continue a careful juggling act between training his divisions, preventing French collapse at Verdun and ensuring French support for the Somme attack.…”

“…For Britain the Somme was a battle fought for intangible strategic gains, to sustain an ally as much as defeat the enemy.' 122 This conclusion is borne out by the contemporary documents that chart the development of GHQ's conception of the coming offensive as the military situation changed over the spring and early summer of 1916. The desire not to attack until the British army was ready ± for practical military as well as realistic political reasons ± and the option to attack in Flanders if the French abandoned their joint effort on the Somme were elements of British strategic planning in the ® rst half of 1916.…”