Anger and Authoritarianism Mediate the Effects of Fear on Support for the Far Right—What Vasilopoulos et al. (2019) Really Found

Jost, John T.

doi:10.1111/pops.12567

Cited by 33 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 27 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Counterintuitively, the present data also indicated a negative relationship between anxiety and RWPP support. This pattern corresponds to an ongoing discussion concerning the role of anger and anxiety on RWPP support (Jost, 2019;Vasilopoulos, Marcus, Valentino, & Foucault, 2019a, 2019b. Contrary to the stable relationship between anger and RWPP support, the present data support different interpretations on the role of anxiety (see Supplementary Materials for additional analysis).…”

Section: Affective Consequences Of Reduced Need Satisfaction and Theisupporting

confidence: 82%

Motivational and affective drivers of right-wing populism support: Insights from an Austrian presidential election

Lueders

Mühlberger

Jonas

2020

Soc. Psychol. Bull.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research has identified political disenchantment as an important driver for the recent spread of right-wing populism. The cultural backlash approach explains this relationship as a counter response to progressive socio-political developments in Western societies. Drawing on previous work, the present research examines motivational and affective factors underlying the support of right-wing populist parties. We hypothesize that a perceived alienation from the symbolic architecture of a society may decrease levels of psychological need satisfaction, which may catalyze into anxiety and anger. As the “political system” represents an important reflective surface for the socio-political status quo, we expected lower levels of need satisfaction and its resulting affective consequences to help explain the relationship between political disenchantment and right-wing populist support. We tested these tenets based on data from the 2016 Austrian presidential election (n = 626). The results of a structural equation model corroborated our predictions with some exceptions. Data indicated a negative relationship between political disenchantment and need satisfaction. Moreover, decreased need satisfaction was associated with increased self-reported anxiety and anger. Political disenchantment indirectly predicted support for a right-wing populist presidential candidate through decreased need satisfaction and anger, thus corroborating the role of anger as an important driver underlying right-wing populism support. Counterintuitively, the data indicated a negative relationship between anxiety and right-wing support. We discuss theoretical and practical implications, as well as limitations stemming from sample characteristics and the employed cross-sectional design.

show abstract

Section: Affective Consequences Of Reduced Need Satisfaction and Theisupporting

confidence: 82%

Motivational and affective drivers of right-wing populism support: Insights from an Austrian presidential election

Lueders

Mühlberger

Jonas

2020

Soc. Psychol. Bull.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We are pleased that John Jost, a valued colleague with a very important contribution in the field of political psychology, has taken an interest in our work and offered an alternative interpretation of our findings (Jost, ). Jost's interpretation rests on two arguments.…”

Section: Claims About Our Model Specificationmentioning

confidence: 95%

Anger Mediates the Effects of Fear on Support for the Far Right—A Rejoinder

Vasilopoulos

Marcus

Valentino

et al. 2019

Political Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We are grateful to John Jost for carefully engaging with our work and presenting a different interpretation of our findings on the effects of fear and anger stemming from the November 13, 2015, Paris attacks on the propensity to vote for the far right. Jost advances a model that holds that anger mediates the effect of fear on support for the far right. In this rejoinder, we respond to the issues he raises regarding our model specification, consider his alternative suggestion, and offer some conclusions about how to resolve this debate empirically. We hope this exchange advances the literature on the impact of various societal threats on voting for the far right.

show abstract

“…Exploring what happens when fear increases without simultaneously accounting for the concurrent appraisal of normative violation, expressed by modulating levels of anger, is likely to generate inaccurate estimates of the impacts of fear and anger (Lerner et al, ). Only if affective appraisals were completely orthogonal—or if it could be demonstrated that one affective appraisal causally precedes the other—would it be valid to examine one affective appraisal without the other also being included in the model (on this point, see Jost, ). But the consequence of the appraisal of uncertainty is not so much directed at impacting the substantive decision of what to choose among any visible options but rather to alter how we go about making that choice.…”

Section: A Brief History Of Emotion In Political Science and Psychologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Applying the Theory of Affective Intelligence to Support for Authoritarian Policies and Parties

Marcus

Valentino

Vasilopoulos

et al. 2019

Political Psychology

101

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Martial Foucault Sciences PoEmotion, after a long period of inattention, began to attract greater scrutiny as a key driver of human behavior in the mid-1980s. One approach that has achieved significant influence in political science is affective intelligence theory (AIT). We deploy AIT here to begin to understand the recent rise in support for right-wing populist leaders around the globe. In particular, we focus on specific emotional appraisals on elections held at periods of heightened threat, including the two 2015 terror attacks in France, as influences on support for the far-right Front National among conservatives. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, we speculate that threats can generate both anger and fear, and with very different political consequences. We expect fear to inhibit reliance on extant political dispositions such as ideological identification and authoritarianism, while anger will strengthen the influence of these same dispositions. Our core findings, across repeated tests, show that fear and anger indeed differentially condition the way habits of thought and action influence support for the far right in the current historical moment. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is anger that mobilizes the far right and authoritarians. Fear, on the other hand, diminishes the impact of these same dispositions.

show abstract

Anger and Authoritarianism Mediate the Effects of Fear on Support for the Far Right—What Vasilopoulos et al. (2019) Really Found

Cited by 33 publications

References 27 publications

Motivational and affective drivers of right-wing populism support: Insights from an Austrian presidential election

Motivational and affective drivers of right-wing populism support: Insights from an Austrian presidential election

Anger Mediates the Effects of Fear on Support for the Far Right—A Rejoinder

Applying the Theory of Affective Intelligence to Support for Authoritarian Policies and Parties

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About