And the Loser Is… Plurality Voting

Laslier, Jean‐François

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_13

Cited by 42 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Surely the simplest and most popular voting rule is plurality, where each agent votes for his favorite candidate and the winner(s) is/are the candidate(s) who obtain a greater number of votes. In spite of its popularity, plurality can be considered to be, in practice, the worst voting rule (see Laslier [20]). Clearly, simplicity is not the most important feature of a voting rule.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Allowing agents to be imprecise: A proposal using multiple linguistic terms

Falcó

García-Lapresta

Roselló

2014

Information Sciences

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In this paper we propose a decision-making procedure where the agents judge the alternatives through linguistic terms such as 'very good', 'good', 'acceptable', etc. If the agents are not confident about their opinions, they can use a linguistic expression formed by several consecutive linguistic terms. To obtain a ranking on the set of alternatives, the method consists of three different stages. The first stage looks for the alternatives in which the overall opinion is closer to the ideal assessment. The overall opinion is developed by a distance-based process among the individual assessments. The next two stages form a tie-breaking process. Firstly by using a dispersion index based on the Gini coefficient, and secondly by taking into account the number of best-assessments. The main characteristics of the proposed decision-making procedure are analyzed.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Allowing agents to be imprecise: A proposal using multiple linguistic terms

Falcó

García-Lapresta

Roselló

2014

Information Sciences

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“…Such a maximin voting rule, which advocates the maximin principle of normative economics, is called fallback bargaining by Brams and Kilgour . It has been characterized in the voting context by Congar and Merlin (see also Llamazares and Peña).The same underlying idea appears in the leximin voting system proposed by Laslier (see also Laslier), and in the Simpson–Kramer method (see Levin and Nalebuff), although in different decisional frameworks. Furthermore, the procedure obtained through the maximum as an aggregation operator is also related to the Coombs method (where the alternative with the largest number of last positions is sequentially withdrawn), as well as to the antiplurality rule (see Baharad and Nitzan and Congar and Merlin). The minimum entails a voting rule called maximax by Congar and Merlin, also characterized by them.…”

Section: The Aggregation Processmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…The same underlying idea appears in the leximin voting system proposed by Laslier (see also Laslier), and in the Simpson–Kramer method (see Levin and Nalebuff), although in different decisional frameworks. Furthermore, the procedure obtained through the maximum as an aggregation operator is also related to the Coombs method (where the alternative with the largest number of last positions is sequentially withdrawn), as well as to the antiplurality rule (see Baharad and Nitzan and Congar and Merlin).…”

Section: The Aggregation Processmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…Its conception is similar to that of the Hare rule, also known as alternative vote (where the alternative with the fewest first positions is sequentially withdrawn). It is also related to the most used (and criticized) voting system: plurality rule (see Laslier and Congar and Merlin). The midrange is related to the basic 1 ‐best‐ 1 ‐worst voting rule (see García‐Lapresta et al Remark There can exist a unique “translation” between weighting vectors and normalized scoring vectors.…”

Section: The Aggregation Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Positional Voting Rules Generated by Aggregation Functions and the Role of Duplication

García-Lapresta

Martínez-Panero

2017

Int. J. Intell. Syst.

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In this paper, we consider a typical voting situation where a group of agents show their preferences over a set of alternatives. Under our approach, such preferences are codified into individual positional values which can be aggregated in several ways through particular functions, yielding positional voting rules and providing a social result in each case. We show that scoring rules belong to such class of positional voting rules. But if we focus our interest on OWA operators as aggregation functions, other well-known voting systems naturally appear. In particular, we determine those ones verifying duplication (i.e., clone irrelevance) and present a proposal of an overall social result provided by them.

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“…For more details on voting in social choice theory and additional voting systems we refer to the studies of Brams and Fishburn (2007), Laslier (2012), Tideman (2007, and Brandt et al (2013).…”

Section: Voting Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Solving hard control problems in voting systems via integer programming

Polyakovskiy

Berghammer

Neumann

2016

European Journal of Operational Research

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a b s t r a c tVoting problems are central in the area of social choice. In this article, we investigate various voting systems and types of control of elections. We present integer linear programming (ILP) formulations for a wide range of NP-hard control problems. Our ILP formulations are flexible in the sense that they can work with an arbitrary number of candidates and voters. Using the off-the-shelf solver Cplex, we show that our approaches can manipulate elections with a large number of voters and candidates efficiently.

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And the Loser Is… Plurality Voting

Cited by 42 publications

References 25 publications

Allowing agents to be imprecise: A proposal using multiple linguistic terms

Allowing agents to be imprecise: A proposal using multiple linguistic terms

Positional Voting Rules Generated by Aggregation Functions and the Role of Duplication

Solving hard control problems in voting systems via integer programming

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