"And Always Keep A-hold of Nurse, for Fear of Finding Something Worse": Challenging Rape Myths in the Courtroom

Abstract

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A systematic review of juries' assessment of rape victims: Do rape myths impact on juror decision-making?

“…Along with law reforms, definitions of rape and sexual intercourse were also broadened to include a series of sexual aggravated offences such as the expansion of intercourse to include oral and anal penetration in addition to vaginal penetration (Bergen, 2006). In England and Wales, a number of reforms took place with a major shift in 1976, which introduced the principle of "without her consent" as opposed to "against her will" (Temkin, 2010). It was not until 1994 that rape definitions were expanded further in England and Wales to include male and marital rape.…”

“…Despite major reforms in rape law and criminal procedure prior to the Sexual Offences Act (2003), a number of reports suggest that conviction rates either remained similar or in some cases they even decreased (e.g. Temkin, 2010;Harris and Grace, 1999).…”

A Critique of Carceral Feminist Arguments on Rape Myths and Sexual Scripts

“…This does not mean we must reject Conaghan and Russell's (2014) affirmation that the definition of a rape myth may include beliefs that are (at least in some contexts) true. Indeed, a definition of rape myths now widely accepted within feminist circles-''descriptive or prescriptive beliefs about rape (i.e., about its causes, context, consequences, perpetrators, victims, and their interaction) that serve to deny, downplay, or justify sexual violence that men commit against women'' (Gerger, Kley, Bohner, & Siebler, 2007; cited by, among others, Temkin, 2010, andMunro, 2010)-is broad enough to include both true and false beliefs.…”

“…14 13. See, for example Temkin (2010), who claims that women who are ''unable to express lack of consent by words or actions'' are excluded from the popular understanding of rape due to the allegedly established and deeply ingrained belief that ''a woman can always withhold consent to sex no matter how drunk she is '' (715-716). Since in the extreme case of victim intoxication that Temkin refers to, this ''belief'' is so clearly nonsense (and Temkin must be right to describe it as ''defy[ing] common sense''), she may be taken to be referring to instances such as Peterson and Muehlenhard's participant #R-063, quoted above, who reported desiring un-consented-to sex.…”

“…Associated with the carceral feminist orthodoxy regarding the traditional sexual script is the similarly orthodox explanation for attrition rates in rape cases: that in the popular mindset, real rape typically conforms to a stereotype involving violence, an outdoors location, and a pathological stranger, which is qualitatively distinct from what rape much more commonly looks like: committed by an acquaintance, friend, partner, or former partner, and may not involve extrinsic violence, injury, torn clothes, obvious signs of trauma, or prompt reporting; and that even if counter-stereotypical rape is itself still visible despite this false belief, jurors' attentions and attitudes are nevertheless sufficiently drawn by it to become confused and reluctant to convict in the more common scenario (Ellison & Munro, 2010;Temkin, 2010).…”