Anchoring in the courtroom: The effects of caps on punitive damages.

Robbennolt, Jennifer K.; Studebaker, Christina A.

doi:10.1023/a:1022312716354

Cited by 66 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 27 publications

(27 reference statements)

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“…It has been shown across various domains, including the legal domain. For instance, when a cap placed on punitive damages is high, it can serve as an anchor such that the size of awarded punitive damages increases as well (Robbennolt and Studebaker 1999). Likewise, sentencing demands of prosecutors influence sentencing decisions (Englich 2006).…”

Section: The Anchoring Effect In the Mars Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Can Bonus Packs Mislead Consumers? A Demonstration of How Behavioural Consumer Research Can Inform Unfair Commercial Practices Law on the Example of the ECJ’s Mars Judgement

Purnhagen

Herpen

2017

J Consum Policy

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The use of psychological findings in EU internal market regulation has gained interest, particularly in the area of unfair commercial practices. This study investigates consumer perceptions of bonus packs containing an oversized indication of the Bextra^volume in the package, such as in the Mars case. The Mars case serves as a standard reference in EU unfair commercial practices law which is used as a benchmark to determine the Baverage consumer.^Our study demonstrates how an experiment can be set up to provide empirically based insights on whether a practice is Bdeceptive.^Results of our experiment show that consumers overestimate the extra volume when confronted with an oversized indication compared to control conditions, which is first empirical evidence that this practice is potentially deceptive.

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Section: The Anchoring Effect In the Mars Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Can Bonus Packs Mislead Consumers? A Demonstration of How Behavioural Consumer Research Can Inform Unfair Commercial Practices Law on the Example of the ECJ’s Mars Judgement

Purnhagen

Herpen

2017

J Consum Policy

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“…By defi nition, of course, caps will effectively control the maximum amount that can be awarded in punitive damages (Robbennolt & Studebaker, 1999). However, we suspect that there may be a cost to this accomplishment in the form of higher and more variable compensatory damage awards in situations in which the punitive damage award is artificially limited.…”

Section: Proposals To Cap Punitive Damage Awardsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a second study, they found no effect of the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct on the amounts of the punitive damage award or compensatory damage award in a case in which all jurors had the option to award punitive damages. Robbennolt and Studebaker (1999) conducted a more direct test of the capping issue. Their participants read a summary of a personal injury lawsuit and awarded compensatory and punitive damages.…”

Section: Paradoxical Effects Of Restricting Punitive Damage Awardsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of limiting punitive damage awards.

Greene¹,

Coon²,

Bornstein³

2001

Law and Human Behavior

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In response to concerns that jury awards in tort cases are excessive and unpredictable, nearly every state legislature has enacted some version of tort reform that is intended to curb extravagant damage awards. One of the most important and controversial reforms involves capping (or limiting) the maximum punitive damage award. We conducted a jury analogue study to assess the impact of this reform. In particular, we examined the possibility that capping punitive awards would cause jurors to inflate their compensatory awards to satisfy their desires to punish the defendant, particularly in situations where the defendant's conduct was highly reprehensible. Relative to a condition in which punitive damages were unlimited, caps on punitive damages did not result in inflation of compensatory awards. However, jurors who had no option to award punitive damages assessed compensatory damages at a significantly higher level than did jurors who had the opportunity to do so. We discuss the policy implications of these findings. THE EFFECTS OF LIMITING PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDSCries for reform first sounded in the 1970s and continue to the present day. The target of this attack is a tort liability system that many people (including insurance, medical, and pharmaceutical executives as well as legislators and judges) perceive as capricious, unpredictable, and out of control (see, e.g., Chookaszian, 1997;Ellis, 1989;Parliman & Shoeman, 1994). Much of the criticism centers on concerns about the perceived excessiveness and unpredictability of jury damage awards. This uncertainty is generally believed to produce inefficiency in terms of businesses' planning for risk-producing activities and in predicting the outcome of a case and negotiating a settlement (Baldus, MacQueen, & Woodworth, 1995).

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“…indicates that jurors consider pain and suffering (Mott, Hans, & Simpson, 2000), injury severity (Mott et al, 2000;Robbennolt & Studebaker, 1999;Wissler et al, 1997), and duration of injury when awarding compensatory damages to a plaintiff in personal injury, automobile negligence, medical malpractice, and insurance bad faith cases. The more severe jurors perceive the injury to be, the higher the pain and suffering award they return is (Robbennolt & Studebaker, 1999).…”

Section: Hart Morry and Saks 1997) Research Into How Jurors Award Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The more severe jurors perceive the injury to be, the higher the pain and suffering award they return is (Robbennolt & Studebaker, 1999). Jurors are most influenced by plaintiff's mental suffering when formulating their awards, followed by the severity of the disability and the severity of the pain experienced .…”

Section: Hart Morry and Saks 1997) Research Into How Jurors Award Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of sexual harassment severity and organizational policy and response on juror damage awards

Cass

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Anchoring in the courtroom: The effects of caps on punitive damages.

Cited by 66 publications

References 27 publications

Can Bonus Packs Mislead Consumers? A Demonstration of How Behavioural Consumer Research Can Inform Unfair Commercial Practices Law on the Example of the ECJ’s Mars Judgement

Can Bonus Packs Mislead Consumers? A Demonstration of How Behavioural Consumer Research Can Inform Unfair Commercial Practices Law on the Example of the ECJ’s Mars Judgement

The effects of limiting punitive damage awards.

The effects of sexual harassment severity and organizational policy and response on juror damage awards

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