Anchoring in lie detection revisited

Zuckerman, Miron; Fischer, Scott A.; Osmun, Roger W.; Winkler, Beatrice A.; Wolfson, Lauren R.

doi:10.1007/bf00999602

Cited by 13 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Such changes can sway their perceptions so that a person who was once seen as deceptive can subsequentlybe viewed as truthful (or vice versa). This finding, and the finding that over half of the participants changed their attributions at least once while watching the stimulus tapes, contradicts past research that indicates that initial impressions of a deceiver tend to anchor and bias later attributions (see Zuckerman et al, 1987;Zuckerman, Koestner, Colella, & Alton, 1984;Zuckerman et al, 1981). It is consistent, however, with literature in social cognition (e.g., Read, 1987), which argues that observed behaviors, inferences, and knowledge can be used to transform collections of attributions.…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 69%

Honest or Deceitful? A Study of Persons' Mental Models for Judging Veracity

Seiter

1997

Human Comm Res

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This studyfocused on understanding the detailed and dynamic mental models that people developfor judging veracity. It was hypothesized that individual d i f m c e s in such mental models, assessed by using Thagard's (1989) ECHO computer simulation program, would predict participunts' attributions and conjidence in making attributions. After watching videotapes of targets, 220 pnrticipants rated targets' veracity and their own conjZence in making attributions. Half of these participants also provided "on-line" information that, in turn, was entered into ECHO. The two groups did not differ in their judgments of veracity, but the on-line group was sign$uzntly more conjiient. Resultsfiom ECHO and network analysis indicated not only that participants' mental models for detecting deception are detailed, changing, and idiosyncratic, varying in their structure and degree of coherence, but also that a number of previously unident$ed cognitive structures are used for detecting deception. Results that conjirm the hypotheses are also presented.H ow do we decide that we are being lied to? Although considerable research has examined the degree to which factors such as suspiciousness (e.g.

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Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 69%

Honest or Deceitful? A Study of Persons' Mental Models for Judging Veracity

Seiter

1997

Human Comm Res

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“…The deception literature is rife with indications that receivers overlook performance flaws and leakage when judging a sender's truthfulness and credibility. In fact, much has been written about receivers' truth biases that advantage deceivers in evading detection (see, e.g., Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990;McCornack & Levine, 1990;Zuckerman, Fisher, Osmun, Winkler, & Wolfson, 1987). Although there is little question that receivers' judgments are partly a function of their own information-processing biases and stereotypes about truthful performance, the current results remind us that senders' own communication carries substantial weight in conferring credibility, particularly the degree of involvement they portray.…”

Section: Does Actual Performance Affect Senders' Credibility?mentioning

confidence: 55%

The Role of Conversational Involvement in Deceptive Interpersonal Interactions

Burgoon

Buller

White

et al. 1999

Pers Soc Psychol Bull

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Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) postulates that interactive deception differs from noninteractive deception due to combined influences of deceiver goals and social skills, mutual influence processes between sender and receiver, feedback, and interaction dynamics. An experiment tested hypotheses that (a) interactive deception displays differ from truthful ones only at the outset of interaction and approximate truthful displays over time, (b) displays are moderated by deceiver social skills, (c) deceivers adapt to receiver communication with reciprocal or compensatory displays, (d) low involvement by receivers conveys negative feedback that instigates more behavioral adjustments by deceivers than does high involvement, and (e) receivers’ postinteraction judgments of deceivers are directly related to deceiver behavioral displays. An experiment in which senders alternated between telling the truth and deceiving, and partners varied their own level of involvement, produced supportive results that have implications for the stability of, and causal mechanisms underlying, deception displays and interpersonal communication generally.

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“…This is paradoxical because most people can control what they say better than how they say it; c. truthfulness or deception biases. Most people tend to judge others as truthful most of the time (O'Sullivan, Ekman, & Friesen, 1988;Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall, Larrance, & Rosenthal, 1979;Zuckerman, Fischer, Osmun, & Winkler, 1987;Zuckerman, Koestner, Colella, & Alton, 1984). Ekman (2001) described a related deception bias among some law enforcement personnel who frequently rated others as lying;…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Fundamental Attribution Error in Detecting Deception: The Boy-Who-Cried-Wolf Effect

O’Sullivan

2003

Pers Soc Psychol Bull

124

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Most people are unable to detect accurately when others are lying. Many explanations for this inability have been suggested but the cognitive heuristics involved in lie detection have received little attention. The present study offers evidence from two experiments, based on two different groups of observers, judging two different kinds of lies, presented in two different testing situations, that the fundamental attribution error significantly undermines the ability to detect honesty and deception accurately. Trait judgments of trustworthiness were highly correlated with state judgments of truthfulness, leading, as predicted, to positive correlations with honest detection accuracy and negative correlations with deception detection accuracy. More accurate lie detectors were significantly more likely than less accurate lie detectors to separate state and trait judgments of honesty. The effect of other biases, such as the halo effect and the truthfulness bias, also are examined. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.

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Anchoring in lie detection revisited

Cited by 13 publications

References 8 publications

Honest or Deceitful? A Study of Persons' Mental Models for Judging Veracity

Honest or Deceitful? A Study of Persons' Mental Models for Judging Veracity

The Role of Conversational Involvement in Deceptive Interpersonal Interactions

The Fundamental Attribution Error in Detecting Deception: The Boy-Who-Cried-Wolf Effect

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