Ancestral Rites and Political Authority in Late Imperial China

Abstract

In 1742, Jiangxi Governor Chen Hongmou ( 1696-1771 ) undertook an experiment to grant lineage headmen (zuzhang and zuzheng) considerable judicial and disciplinary powers over their kinsmen, to be exercised in conjunction with their officiating over the sacrificial rites at the ancestral temple (zongsi). Chen was broadly regarded, both in his day and after, as a model provincial governor and an exemplar of the style of governance known as jingshi (ordering the world, or, more loosely, &dquo;statecraft&dquo;), and this action in 1742 seems to have been seen fairly quickly as a touchstone for his overall political approach. In this article, I want to look not only at Chen's initiative itself but also at the creative way his experiment was read by later figures in the Qing statecraft tradition. What I hope this will illuminate is the seductive appeals and practical limitations of the ideology of governance through &dquo;natu-ral&dquo; local elites and, still more generally, the enduring tension between family and state in late imperial Chinese history.

Social organizations and political institutions: why China and Europe diverged

“…In the former case, confederations of guilds and of native-place associations extended to everybody services that were initially reserved for their members. In the market town of Hankow, the main guilds gained powers informally to enact and enforce commercial legislation, maintained infrastructures, and even controlled firefighting and police services (Rowe 1984). Similar arrangements emerged in several other cities described by Skinner (1977, pp.…”

“…The lijia tax system initiated by the first Ming emperor (Hongwu, 1368–1398) gave village elders legal authority on various matters. In 1397, the Ming legal code granted lineage heads ( zuzhang ) legal status and identified their role as presiding over the ancestral rites (Rowe 1998, p. 389).…”

“…Along these lines, Xue (2021) argues that autocratic rule and political repressions reduced social capital. 14 Others, such as Wakeman (1993) and Rowe (1993), have agonized over the question. Rankin (1990) notes that whatever civil society there was, it was defined between groups: the state and local community organizations, or locally defined elite networks.…”

Social Organizations and Political Institutions: Why China and Europe Diverged

“…In the former case, confederations of guilds and of native-place associations extended to everybody services that were initially reserved for their members. In the market town of Hankow, the main guilds informally gained powers to enact and enforce commercial legislation, maintained infrastructures, they even controlled firefighting and police services (Rowe 1984). Similar arrangements emerged in several other cities described in Skinner (1977), p. 549-50.…”

The clan and the corporation: Sustaining cooperation in China and Europe

“…In China the state could not rely on the local social organizations to implement policies contrary to their interests. Moreover, strengthening and institutionalizing lineage power increased the ability of clans to resist state authority (Rowe, 1998, Hung, 2009. As a result, the Chinese state authorities delegated to the clan the implementation of mutually bene…cial policies, but relied on a parallel administration to implement policies which the clans did not favor.…”