Anarchy, self-governance, and legal titling

Murtazashvili, Ilia; Murtazashvili, Jennifer Brick

doi:10.1007/s11127-014-0222-y

Cited by 64 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 73 publications

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“…On the contrary: they are assuming that the third-party enforcer will be ruling on transactions in 5. This argument is applicable to many accounts of allegedly "private" ordering solutions, including those relating to the Californian gold rush (Umbeck 1977), self-governing property arrangements (Ostrom 1990), the Merchant Law (Benson 1990), medieval Jewish Maghribi traders (Greif 1989(Greif , 1993, medieval fairs (Milgrom et al 1990), the US West (Anderson and Hill 2004) or even anarchist solutions for land titling (Murtazashvili and Murtazashvili 2015). Some of these accounts also underestimate the reliance of these solutions on the state and, more generally, the interaction between local and wider institutions in parallel with the scope of the relevant market.…”

Section: The Role Of the Third Party Enforcermentioning

confidence: 99%

Coase and the departure from property

Arruñada¹

2016

The Elgar Companion to Ronald H. Coase

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In "The Problem of Social Cost," Coase (1960) used a simplified conception of property rights as the outcome of mere contracting in independent exchanges. This conception has been suitable for successfully analyzing many important issues, including that of externalities related to the use of assets and public goods. However, its implicit assumption that exchange in property rights does not affect future transaction costs provides an inadequate basis for understanding property institutions and has caused confusion on the efficacy of private ordering and the role of the state and legal institutions. It has thus limited the scope of most of the economics of so-called property rights to analyses of political interactions and contract rights in personal exchanges. In the real world, property is defined by interaction between multiple exchanges which cause exchange-related non-contractible externalities among market participants. When such exchange-related externalities are considered, property becomes inherently linked to public and legal interventions, which are indispensable to reach true property-that is, in rem-enforcement and truly impersonal-asset-based-exchange.

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Section: The Role Of the Third Party Enforcermentioning

confidence: 99%

Coase and the departure from property

Arruñada¹

2016

The Elgar Companion to Ronald H. Coase

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“…Part of the problem is that people do not trust the government, which is often implicated in land grabbing (AREU, 2017). Anarchy is for many Afghans a better option than dealing with the predatory Afghan government (Murtazashvili and Murtazashvili, 2015). However, there have been some success with community-based land registration and adjudication.…”

Section: Illustrating the Politics Of Private Property Rights To Landmentioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of land property rights

Cai

Murtazashvili

2019

Journal of Institutional Economics

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Legal reforms that improve the security of private property rights to land have characteristics of a public good with dispersed benefits. However, nothing ensures that the state will provide property protection as a public good. Some states provide property protection selectively to powerful groups. Others are unable to provide property protection. In this paper, we argue that whether the state provides property protection as a public good, selectively, or cannot establish private property rights depends on the following features of politics: political stability, government capacity to administer and enforce private property rights, constraints on political decision-makers, and the inclusivity of political and legal institutions. We illustrate the theory using evidence from reforms that increased opportunities to privately own land in the US from the late eighteenth through nineteenth centuries, selective enforcement of land property rights in China, and the absence of credible legal rights to land in Afghanistan.

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“…Murtazashvili and Murtazashvili () study informal governance relating to land title by leading field work in 32 Afghan villages including semi‐structured interviews, focus groups and participant observation. They find that, given the constraints on the formal political and legal institutions in Afghanistan, formal legal land titling may underperform self‐governing alternatives.…”

Section: Comparative Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Post‐genocide justice: The Gacaca courts

O’Reilly

Zhang²

2018

Development Policy Review

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In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, the crippled formal judicial system failed to administer justice in a timely manner. A modified version of the traditional Gacaca courts was introduced to hear cases from the backlog of over 100,000 genocide suspects. We find that the Gacaca courts performed well relative to the formal justice system, given the constraints faced. The Gacaca courts generated valuable information about the genocide suspects and increased access to the justice system. The introduction of the Gacaca courts improved the performance of the formal justice system and facilitated post‐conflict recovery.

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Anarchy, self-governance, and legal titling

Cited by 64 publications

References 73 publications

Coase and the departure from property

Coase and the departure from property

The politics of land property rights

Post‐genocide justice: The Gacaca courts

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