Analyzing Precautionary Regulation: Do Precaution, Science, and Innovation Go Together?

Abstract

In this article we argue that the precautionary principle, as applied to the regulation of science and technology, cannot be considered in any general manner inconsistent with the norms and methods of scientific knowledge generation and justification. Moreover, it does not necessarily curtail scientific-technological innovation. Our argument flows from a differentiated view of what precaution in regulation means. We first characterize several of the most relevant interpretations given to the precautionary principle in academic debate and regulatory practice. We then use examples of actual precaution-based regulation to show that, even though science can have varying functions in different circumstances and frames, all of those interpretations recur to scientific method and knowledge, and tend to imply innovation in methods, products, and processes. In fact, the interplay of regulation and innovation in precautionary policy, at least in the case of the interpretations of precaution that our analysis takes into account, could be understood as a way of reconciling the two fundamental science and technology policy functions of promotion and control.

Multi‐Case Review of the Application of the Precautionary Principle in European Union Law and Case Law

“…Proponents counter that the disbenefits are hypothetical, that the protection of the environment and human health is an overriding priority, and that the costs of the consequences of a lack of precaution may also be large . They also point to research that suggests that the application of regulation may stimulate innovation in technology, products, and processes …”

“…(20) They also point to research that suggests that the application of regulation may stimulate innovation in technology, products, and processes. (20,21) The precautionary principle has also been defended, especially for extreme risks (i.e., those with extremely severe consequences), as providing "an ethical, normative principle for dealing with an uncertain future, where, given the complexity and interconnectedness of the natural and social systems in which we live, catastrophic black swans are more likely to occur." (22) It has also been argued that "objective risk" does not exist independently of the preferences, beliefs, and moral choices of people and society.…”

When communicating health-related knowledge, beware of the black holes of the knowledge landscapes geography

“…It is also important for the innovators and the professionals to have a forum to spread and exchange their ideas and to facilitate implementation, eg, of new approaches for the better health care. This dynamic also works the other way around and represents a significant risk of knowledge landscapes distortion by undermining reflexive processes that ensure context sensibility, and by avoiding the use of precautionary principles and implementation of ethics (13). …”

Anticipating or Accommodating to Public Concern? Risk Amplification and the Politics of Precaution Reexamined

“…Advocates of the PP typically argue that adopting a “better safe than sorry” approach addresses failings in the traditional machinery of governments to handle scientific uncertainties because it facilitates anticipatory policy debate and decision making, which can allow for the forestalling of actions that could potentially threaten serious harm, or might otherwise lead to irreversible damage (Gee et al., ; Hess, ). Against this view, critics counter that the PP is ill‐defined, incoherent, inconsistently applied, and lacks scientific credibility, especially when its use narrows policy deliberations of countervailing risks or the weighing of costs and benefits across given activities (Aven, ; Graham & Hsia, ; Hom, Plaza, & Palmén, ; Löfstedt, ; Sunstein, ; Todt & Luján, ). The PP is thus seen by critics as an unwelcome challenge to the dominance of economic and scientific policy discourse (Drake, ; Gee et al., ; Hansen, von Krauss, & Tickner, ; Löfstedt, ; Sandin, Peterson, Hansson, Rudén, & Juthe, ).…”

“…The PP is thus seen by critics as an unwelcome challenge to the dominance of economic and scientific policy discourse (Drake, ; Gee et al., ; Hansen, von Krauss, & Tickner, ; Löfstedt, ; Sandin, Peterson, Hansson, Rudén, & Juthe, ). Consequently, questions commonly arise as to whether calls for precaution in policy discourse are more often employed to influence public confidence, or through a genuine interest to avert “real” dangers and promote better knowledge and reasoned dialogue (Burgess, ; Drake, ; Graham & Hsia, ; Hansen et al., ; Hom et al., ; Löfstedt, , ; Marchant & Mossman, ; Sandin et al., ; Sunstein, ; Todt & Luján, ).…”