Analyzing Corporate Governance Model with Chinese Characteristics and Accounting Information Disclosure: a Quasi-natural Experimental Study Based on a Special Institutional Arrangement

Abstract

A new corporate governance model for SOEs with Chinese characteristics was implemented in China in 2016, in which a 4 + 1 (Chinese Communist Party committee, shareholders' meeting, board of directors, board of supervisors + managers) corporate governance structure was formed by integrating the Party organization into the traditional Western 3 + 1 structure (shareholders' meeting, board of directors, board of supervisors + managers), and it was a major breakthrough of the modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics. With this brand-new institutional arrangement as a quasi-nature experiment, the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Differences in Differences (PSM-DID) methods have been used in this paper to empirically test the impact of the corporate governance model with Chinese characteristics on accounting information disclosure of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). It has been found in the study that the corporate governance model with Chinese characteristics has improved the transparency of accounting information of SOEs in China, but no signi cant contribution to the quality of accounting information has been identi ed. Samples are subdivided in view of the in uence of the hierarchy and internal governance of Chinese SOEs. In central government-owned enterprises or those with a low level of internal control, the new governance model plays a more prominent role in enhancing the transparency of accounting information. The study veri es the positive effect of the corporate governance model with Chinese characteristics in improving the level of accounting information disclosure. Also, the study has practical signi cance in enhancing the corporate governance system with Chinese characteristics.

Does state capital equity affect ESG performance of private firms?—based on the perspective of sustainable development of Chinese enterprises

“…This will help reduce internal fraud and prevent major shareholders from obtaining personal benefits through abusive decision-making, transfer of resources, or improper transactions. On the other hand, state-owned capital can actively promote the organization of small-and medium-sized shareholders or appoint representatives of small-and medium-sized shareholders to the board of directors, optimize the structure of directors, promote the establishment of a sound information disclosure system by enterprises, provide comprehensive and accurate financial and operational information, strengthen the voice of small-and medium-sized shareholders in the board of directors' strategy formulation and operational decision-making process, and ensure that outside investors have a comprehensive understanding of the company's operations and decision-making process (Yang et al, 2023). According to the inference, the state-owned capital, as a stakeholder in the development of the enterprise, can improve the level of corporate governance by optimizing the shareholding structure of the company and perfecting the internal control system and alleviate agency problems of "shareholders-creditors," "major shareholders-minor shareholders" and "major shareholders-minor shareholders."…”