Analytical categories to describe deficit attributions in deep disagreements between citizens and experts

Abstract

Disagreements often arise from citizen–expert collaboration, as both agents share a different epistemic worldview. Fogelin, following Wittgenstein, proposed that some disagreements (i.e. deep disagreements) cannot be rationally solved when participants share different forms of life. Citizen–expert is an exemplar of this sort of disagreement. Moreover, deep disagreements are often followed by deficit attributions from one of the agents to the other, regarding their epistemic understanding, credibility, and motives. Articulating the notions of deep disagreements and deficit attributions, as well as reviewing the complementary concept of epistemic injustice, we have constructed analytical categories that allow us to understand two things: (1) how deficit attributions operate in dialogical contexts of deep disagreements and (2) what types of deficit attributions we can find. We expect that this characterization can serve to analyze citizen–expert dialogues and the pursuit of more modest and inclusive forms of conversation.

Scientific Holism: A Synoptic (“Two-Eyed Seeing”) Approach to Science Transfer in Education for Sustainable Development, Tested with Pre-Service Teachers

“…The pandemic has reinforced this thinking [3]. Paradoxically, despite ongoing efforts at public engagement, public discourse has been affected by a subtle, top-down dynamic of scientism [4] that has generated scepticism [5] and sometimes even rejection of science [6], This is also known as the backfire effect [7], and it is suggested that we need to be more imaginative in presenting alternative models of scientific governance and fostering a culture of experimentation [8].…”

“…synoptic transfer would not deny the shortcomings of laypeople, but it would limit these shortcomings to the scientific image and equally point out the limitations of scientific experts in interpreting science in the manifest image, a stance that prohibits contributions that rely on persuasion and assume a paternalistic relationship between science and the public [4]. This would avoid the cardinal error of deficit thinking, which focuses on getting the facts right rather than understanding the interplay of information, social structures, media ecologies and socio-psychological dynamics [3].…”