Analytic Conservatism

Abstract

We propose an analytic account of dispositional conservatism that attempts to uncover a foundation of what is often taken to be an anti-foundationalist position. We identify a bias in favour of the status quo as a key component of the conservative disposition and address the question of the justification of such a conservative disposition, and the circumstances in which the widespread adoption of such a disposition might be normatively desirable. Our analysis builds on a structural link between the economist's traditional emphasis on questions of feasibility and the conservative's attachment to the status quo.

The Lack of Competition in Governance as an Impediment to Regional Development in Australia

“…Brennan and Buchanan 1985;Brennan and Hamlin 2004;Buchanan 1975) have used Public Choice theory to argue on utilitarian grounds for constitutions that limit political innovation. If the risk of breaking existing political order outweighs the potential benefits of reform, the sensible option is to leave well enough alone and to protect the status quo through constitutional constraints limiting political experimentation.…”

What does it take to be a true conservative?

“…(411) Given that Oakeshott contents himself with providing a phenomenological description of the conservative disposition "as it appears in contemporary character" (407), he does not attempt to scrutinize whether the two inclinations are grounded in rationales that both constitute logically sufficient conditions for being conservative. Brennan and Hamlin (2004; …”

“…The common topos of these arguments is often that the test of time is an equally important, if not superior, guide to good governance as compared with scientific risk calculation. Brennan and Hamlin (2004) themselves piece together another line of justification from economic theory that is predicated upon the diminishing marginal utility of preferences plus the assumption of uncertainty. If a reform is assumed to be equally likely to increase or decrease the desired value by the same amount, it is rational to oppose the reform because "the potential welfare losses from moving in the 'wrong' direction systematically exceed the potential gains from moving in the 'right' direction" (685).…”

Analytic conservatism and analytic radicalism: Of understated distinctions and other analytical things

“…In an interesting set of papers published over the last decade, Brennan and Hamlin (2003, 2004, 2006, 2013 provide a number of different explanations of analytic conservatism. Their account ranges widely from dispositions to a so-called convexity argument, 1 in which they claim individuals will have a status quo bias & Michael Brooks michael.brooks@utas.edu.au 1 Tasmanian School of Business and Economics, University of Tasmania, Private Bag 84, Hobart, TAS 7001, Australia 1 It is worth noting there is a misleading use of terminology in Hamlin's initial articles (2003, 16 and2004, at various places on the following pages: 686, 687 and 688) and their reply (2013) to Taylor.…”

“…Their account ranges widely from dispositions to a so-called convexity argument, 1 in which they claim individuals will have a status quo bias & Michael Brooks michael.brooks@utas.edu.au 1 Tasmanian School of Business and Economics, University of Tasmania, Private Bag 84, Hobart, TAS 7001, Australia 1 It is worth noting there is a misleading use of terminology in Hamlin's initial articles (2003, 16 and2004, at various places on the following pages: 686, 687 and 688) and their reply (2013) to Taylor. Brennan and Hamlin identify correctly that their argument relies on the convexity of preferences, but erroneously associate convexity of preferences with convexity of the value function.…”