Analysis on Security Issues for Mobile P2P Networks

Tang, Helen; Yang, Zhi-Xing; Chen, Long

doi:10.1109/wicom.2012.6478429

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Pollution is categorized based on the attackers’ strategy: (1) metadata pollution, where a file extension or name is modified and replaced with a misleading one; (2) content pollution, where the file content is changed; and (3) index pollution, where an attacker claims ownership of an unindexed bogus file and uploads its record (IP address, port number, etc) to the entities (eg, super peers on hybrid P2P) that maintain such records for distribution [ 73 , 77 ]. In most cases, the polluters also attack legitimate peers’ reputations or boost their own reputation through whitewashing attacks [ 75 , 76 ]. Content pollution is the most popular and common attack in P2P streaming systems [ 74 ]; it was detected in 50%-80% of files in KaZaA and about 50% of popular files in eDonkey [ 73 , 74 ].…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This enables the attacker to own a deciding power of where in the ID space the new nodes are placed. When the attacker owns more nodes than the benign nodes in the segment, the attacker can control messages in the segment, bias reputation score, create DDoS situations, or force servers to exceed their CPU capacity [ 26 , 76 , 84 ], which is also known as a gateway attack [ 92 ]. In blockchain P2P networks, Sybil attacks are, for instance, used by attackers to outvote the honest nodes in the network [ 52 , 63 , 104 ], which enables the attacker to cheat without being detected.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…DDoS is an active attack that makes it more aggressive. An attacker often attacks the network to prevent certain users from performing their tasks or put the system out of service in one or many segments of the underlying infrastructure [ 76 , 84 ]. The probability of a DDoS attack is high in large P2P networks because nodes have to be reachable (usually outside of firewalls restrictions, etc) by the network [ 92 , 117 ].…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Security Engineering of Patient-Centered Health Care Information Systems in Peer-to-Peer Environments: Systematic Review

Yari¹,

Dehling²,

Kluge³

et al. 2021

J Med Internet Res

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Background Patient-centered health care information systems (PHSs) enable patients to take control and become knowledgeable about their own health, preferably in a secure environment. Current and emerging PHSs use either a centralized database, peer-to-peer (P2P) technology, or distributed ledger technology for PHS deployment. The evolving COVID-19 decentralized Bluetooth-based tracing systems are examples of disease-centric P2P PHSs. Although using P2P technology for the provision of PHSs can be flexible, scalable, resilient to a single point of failure, and inexpensive for patients, the use of health information on P2P networks poses major security issues as users must manage information security largely by themselves. Objective This study aims to identify the inherent security issues for PHS deployment in P2P networks and how they can be overcome. In addition, this study reviews different P2P architectures and proposes a suitable architecture for P2P PHS deployment. Methods A systematic literature review was conducted following PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) reporting guidelines. Thematic analysis was used for data analysis. We searched the following databases: IEEE Digital Library, PubMed, Science Direct, ACM Digital Library, Scopus, and Semantic Scholar. The search was conducted on articles published between 2008 and 2020. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System was used as a guide for rating security issues. Results Our findings are consolidated into 8 key security issues associated with PHS implementation and deployment on P2P networks and 7 factors promoting them. Moreover, we propose a suitable architecture for P2P PHSs and guidelines for the provision of PHSs while maintaining information security. Conclusions Despite the clear advantages of P2P PHSs, the absence of centralized controls and inconsistent views of the network on some P2P systems have profound adverse impacts in terms of security. The security issues identified in this study need to be addressed to increase patients’ intention to use PHSs on P2P networks by making them safe to use.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Security Engineering of Patient-Centered Health Care Information Systems in Peer-to-Peer Environments: Systematic Review

Yari¹,

Dehling²,

Kluge³

et al. 2021

J Med Internet Res

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Cooperative Caching Strategies for Mobile Peer-to-Peer Networks: A Survey

Zhou

Zou

Song

et al. 2016

Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering

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Security Engineering of Patient-Centered Health Care Information Systems in Peer-to-Peer Environments: Systematic Review (Preprint)

Yari¹,

Dehling²,

Kluge³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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BACKGROUND Patient-centered health care information systems (PHSs) enable patients to take control and become knowledgeable about their own health, preferably in a secure environment. Current and emerging PHSs use either a centralized database, peer-to-peer (P2P) technology, or distributed ledger technology for PHS deployment. The evolving COVID-19 decentralized Bluetooth-based tracing systems are examples of disease-centric P2P PHSs. Although using P2P technology for the provision of PHSs can be flexible, scalable, resilient to a single point of failure, and inexpensive for patients, the use of health information on P2P networks poses major security issues as users must manage information security largely by themselves. OBJECTIVE This study aims to identify the inherent security issues for PHS deployment in P2P networks and how they can be overcome. In addition, this study reviews different P2P architectures and proposes a suitable architecture for P2P PHS deployment. METHODS A systematic literature review was conducted following PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) reporting guidelines. Thematic analysis was used for data analysis. We searched the following databases: IEEE Digital Library, PubMed, Science Direct, ACM Digital Library, Scopus, and Semantic Scholar. The search was conducted on articles published between 2008 and 2020. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System was used as a guide for rating security issues. RESULTS Our findings are consolidated into 8 key security issues associated with PHS implementation and deployment on P2P networks and 7 factors promoting them. Moreover, we propose a suitable architecture for P2P PHSs and guidelines for the provision of PHSs while maintaining information security. CONCLUSIONS Despite the clear advantages of P2P PHSs, the absence of centralized controls and inconsistent views of the network on some P2P systems have profound adverse impacts in terms of security. The security issues identified in this study need to be addressed to increase patients’ intention to use PHSs on P2P networks by making them safe to use.

show abstract

Analysis on Security Issues for Mobile P2P Networks

Cited by 3 publications

References 11 publications

Security Engineering of Patient-Centered Health Care Information Systems in Peer-to-Peer Environments: Systematic Review

Security Engineering of Patient-Centered Health Care Information Systems in Peer-to-Peer Environments: Systematic Review

Cooperative Caching Strategies for Mobile Peer-to-Peer Networks: A Survey

Security Engineering of Patient-Centered Health Care Information Systems in Peer-to-Peer Environments: Systematic Review (Preprint)

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