Analysis on mobile WiMAX security

WiMAX Security Threats And Their Counter Measures

“…Such an attack would also enable the rogue BS to impersonate name servers, allowing it to redirect user requests to computers with malware without easy detection. [6]. IEEE 802.16 multicast and initial network entry management messages do not add this digest.…”

Security Enhencement & Solution for Authentication Frame work in IEEE 802.16

“…In the admission control process, the reception of this message at Base Station initiates the cyclic authentication procedure. In Water-Torture attack, these triggering messages are captured and are transmitted in a loop to cause trigger flooding thus, employing one-way authentication [13]. Time Stamping model and the PKM v1 model are vulnerable to this type of infringement attempt.…”

“…DoS attacks such as unprotected network entry, unprotected management frame, unencrypted management communication, weak key sharing mechanism in multicast and broadcast operations and Reset-Command message [13]. Some DoS attacks are include the following:…”

“…The Auth-invalid is sent from a B.S to a M.S when AK shared between BS and M.S expires or B.S is unable to verify the HMAC/CMAC properly [13]. This message is not protected by HMAC and it has PKM identifier equal to zero and it can be used as DoS tool to invalidate legitimate SS.…”

“…This message is protected by HMAC but is still potential to be used to perform a DoS attacks. In order to prevent DoS attacks, first need to fix the vulnerabilities in the initial network entry & secure authentication technique [13].…”