Analysis of reactive jamming against satellite communications

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the feasibility of reactive jamming in a satellite communications scenario and propose a countermeasure that takes advantage of the constraints associated with reactive jamming. A reactive jammer is a type of jammer that has the ability to sense a portion of spectrum and immediately transmit a jamming signal when it senses a signal it wants to jam. Thus, a reactive jammer can counter the processing gain associated with frequency hopping spread spectrum. This paper provides a three-step approach to analyzing the primary constraints associated with reactive jamming, as well as detailed example scenarios (both theoretical and simulated) that demonstrate the feasibility analysis. Additional clarity is provided by splitting the analysis into uplink and downlink jamming. A strategy to mitigate the effects of reactive jamming is presented, which takes advantage of the geometric constraints of reactive jamming by using a coding and interleaving scheme that results in the transmitted bits appearing at the very beginning of each hop. This work demonstrates that reactive jamming is a valid threat to satellite communication systems. The analysis and simulation results suggest that as long as the geographical area around user terminals is free of reactive jammers, substantial mitigation can be achieved using the proposed mitigation strategy.Reactive jamming is widely discussed in open literature [9][10][11][12]. The authors of [3] introduce the concept of classifying jammers into the categories of constant, deceptive, random, and reactive. A large portion of reactive jamming literature is based on wireless sensor networks (WSN) [9,[13][14][15][16]. While

Satellite-Based Communications Security: A Survey of Threats, Solutions, and Research Challenges

“…Similarly to previous physical-layer solutions, also anti-jamming strategies mostly considered the Satellite-to-Ground communication link, focusing on increasing the availability of satellite services on the ground. A few works, such as [104], [108], and [116], considered also the Groundto-Satellite link, while only one work, i.e, [116], discussed anti-jamming solutions for the Ground-to-Ground link. The Satellite-to-Satellite link is never considered because of the actual hardness of the jamming at high distances, though further studies on this segment would be valuable..…”

“…Most of the analyzed works considered single jamming devices that are usually easier to detect and isolate from a SATCOM link due to its vast coverage range. Other recent contributions, such [104], [106], [108], [110], [111], [116] introduced particular techniques to defend the commercial and civilian SATCOMs when one or more jammers are deployed in the scenario, thus being more effective in real deployments. Indeed, the deployment of multiple jammers is an essential problem in tactical and military scenarios, where the adversary is so powerful to make the adoption of the current solutions challenging or impractical.…”

Securing Public Safety Communications on Commercial and Tactical 5G Networks: A Survey and Future Research Directions

“…Intercepting the uplink (ground-to-satellite) transmission, on the other hand, is more challenging due to the highly directional antenna of the very-small-aperture terminal (VSAT) user equipment. In practice, the adversary would need to be very close to the VSAT on the ground or a UAV or a crane car would be needed to lift the intercept receiver near the main lobe of the transmit signal [136]. While this is significantly more challenging than eavesdropping of the downlink transmission, intercepting the uplink signal is still feasible, at least at higher latitudes, where the elevation angle of the GEO satellite is low.…”

“…If the malicious signal is strong and of the same form as the legitimate signal, it may block the transmissions of the legitimate users. Since commercial systems may not be protected against malicious interference, a denial-ofservice attack via hostile electromagnetic interference is possible [133], [136], [142]. The downlink signal to the tactical bubble can also be jammed directly, but due to the highly directional antenna of the user equipment, the malicious transmitter would need to be very close to the VSAT, or elevated near the main lobe of the receiving antenna, as in the case of uplink eavesdropping discussed earlier.…”

Technology challenges of stealth unmanned combat aerial vehicles

“…Reactive jammers remain idle as long as no incoming signals are being detected, and start transmitting otherwise, which reduces the power required and the probability of being detected by passive radar systems. Their effectiveness has been assessed in wireless networks and satellite communication security (52,53) . More recently, digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) technology allows the recording of an incoming radio wave and its modification prior to being sent back in order to convey deceptive information (54) , and can be used to greatly reduce a vehicle's RCS signature and radar detection range (55) .…”