Analysis of LNG peakshaving-facility release-prevention systems

Pelto, P.J.; Baker, E.G.; Powers, T.B.; Schreiber, Andrea; Hobbs, J. M.; Daling, P.M.

doi:10.2172/6747398

Cited by 4 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…FERC provided a table of failure rates to use in identifying single accidental leakage scenarios and a citation list of piping failure rate studies. FERC has stated that the guidance is “based on published failure rates for LNG facilities .” However, the underlying studies that FERC relied upon to derive the threshold failure frequency criteria for LNG facilities for single accidental leak source size determination (i.e., 3 × 10 − 4 –5 × 10 − 4 per year) are largely based on generic industry data not LNG‐specific data . Since historical data of LNG failure events are very rare, there is a lack of available historical data within the industry.…”

Section: Discussion Of Failure Rates and Databasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Table and present the failure rate data from FERC‐cited sources that FERC appeared to rely upon to derive the threshold failure frequency criteria for LNG facilities. Existing failure rate data appear in a multitude of sources including those cited by FERC and other referenced industry databases . A sampling of relevant data to LNG facilities is summarized below.…”

Section: Discussion Of Failure Rates and Databasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fault Tree Analysis from Pelto et al () representing release from an LNG storage tank outlet line. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.…”

Section: Discussion Of Failure Rates and Databasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Given their assumptions, Pelto et al () estimated that the outlet line will rupture about 5 × 10 − 5 times per year, which corresponds to the upper bound of FERC's threshold failure rate criterion. As a comparison, Welker and Johnson provided a summary of LNG industry failure rates in 1981 based on an industry survey .…”

Section: Discussion Of Failure Rates and Databasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The original Pelto et al () failure rate derivations included an operational duty cycle adjustment factor. The peakshaver storage tank LNG outlet line analysis explicitly identified this factor as an assumption of 20 days per year for operation.…”

Section: Discussion Of Failure Rates and Databasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

New quantitative risk criteria for US LNG facilities

McInerney

Hart

Morrison

et al. 2014

Process Safety Progress

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The recent increase in natural gas production has expanded the outlook for exporting domestically produced natural gas. As a result, many existing liquefied natural gas (LNG) import facilities in the United States are proposing to construct liquefaction facilities collocated with existing import terminals. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviews and approves applications for construction. As part of this process, the applicant must perform specific hazardous release consequence analyses to demonstrate flammable vapor dispersion exclusion zones, thermal radiation exclusion zones, and explosion overpressure exclusion zones to meet criteria established in 49 CFR 193 and NFPA 59A. Over the last few years, FERC has refined the risk analysis criteria for LNG facility construction projects. While the current regulations do not specify quantitative risk assessment (QRA) as a necessary hazard analysis tool, FERC has recently issued guidance for the selection of leak sizes based upon failure frequencies for piping systems. In particular, scenarios with failure frequencies greater than 3 × 10−5 per year must be considered. The underlying studies that FERC relied upon to derive the failure frequency criterion for single accidental leak source size determination (i.e., 3 × 10−5 to 5 × 10−5 per year) are largely based on generic industry data not LNG‐specific data. The net result of this criterion has been to require elements of QRA as part of LNG facility permitting process to identify the scenarios that need to be considered and those that do not. This is a shift in the paradigm away from prescriptive leak sizes and single accidental release scenarios that had been used for receiving terminals constructed over the last decade. This shift in paradigm coincides with and was likely motivated by the North American transition from receiving terminals to liquefaction export terminals. Receiving terminals are considerably simpler in their design than export terminals, which require refrigeration units to liquefy the gas. This article aims to provide an analysis and discussion of the FERC failure frequency arguments grounded in the strength and weaknesses of the underlying databases. An open question is whether this new criterion provides a reasonable improvement in safety over the prior requirements. The underlying historic databases and studies do not reflect the major differences on the safety records between the LNG industry and general industry. More specifically, they do not necessarily take into consideration the effects of cryogenic processes, management systems, materials of construction, or failure modes on the failure rate data. Given the basis of generic industry failure rates, the question arises as to whether the failure rate thresholds that trigger the requirement to consider certain scenarios are appropriate. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 237–246, 2014

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Section: Discussion Of Failure Rates and Databasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussion Of Failure Rates and Databasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussion Of Failure Rates and Databasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussion Of Failure Rates and Databasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussion Of Failure Rates and Databasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

New quantitative risk criteria for US LNG facilities

McInerney

Hart

Morrison

et al. 2014

Process Safety Progress

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show abstract

Hydrogen-based aircraft auxiliary power generation: Economic and ecological comparative assessment of preventive maintenance implications

Meissner,

Rahn,

Oestreicher

et al. 2024

IFAC-PapersOnLine

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Applications of human factors engineering to LNG release prevention and control

Shikiar¹,

Rankin²,

Rideout³

1982

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2. Assessment of Research and Development (R&D) Needs in Ammonia Safety and Environmental Control {PNL-4006} 3. An Overview Study of LNG Release Prevention and Control Systems (PNL-4014) 4. Analysis of LNG Import Terminal Release Prevention Systems {PNL-4152} 5. Analysis of LNG Peakshaving Facility Release Prevention Systems {PNL-4153} Work in progress includes more detailed studies of topics identified in the LNG facility overview study as being worthy of further investigation. Other reports of this series are in preparation on the following subjects:-Storage Tank Analysis-Fire Prevention and Control Assessment

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Analysis of LNG peakshaving-facility release-prevention systems

Cited by 4 publications

References 1 publication

New quantitative risk criteria for US LNG facilities

New quantitative risk criteria for US LNG facilities

Hydrogen-based aircraft auxiliary power generation: Economic and ecological comparative assessment of preventive maintenance implications

Applications of human factors engineering to LNG release prevention and control

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