Analysis of green technology investment for Chinese waste electrical and electronic equipment processing enterprises under different subsidy modes

Li, Wenhua; Wang, Jun‐Tao

doi:10.1007/s10098-020-02010-x

Cited by 8 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 40 publications

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“…Notably, game theory, which is a tool for studying the strategic choices of participants, can be used to effectively analyze the entire process of interaction between the government and companies. Using game theory, Li and Wang (2021) assessed the impact of subsidies on GTI investment, and Zu et al (2018) employed a Stackelberg game to analyze the optimal strategies of the government and companies in supply chains.…”

Section: Green Technology Innovation (Gti) Embodies Both "Innovation"mentioning

confidence: 99%

Substantial innovation or strategic innovation: An evolutionary game analysis of companies' green technology innovation strategies under carbon emission trading market

Cui,

Chun,

Shui

et al. 2024

Manage Decis Econ

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Although both the carbon emission trading market (CETM) and government regulatory actions promote companies' green technology innovation (GTI), little research has considered whether such innovation is substantial. In this paper, we categorize companies' GTI strategies into substantial innovation and strategic innovation. Considering market powers, the heterogeneity of companies, and the mutual influence of governments and companies, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model that involves large and small companies and the government and conduct a simulation utilizing data on China's CETM. Our findings reveal that carbon trading prices, innovation subsidies, and the government's verification mechanism are the main factors that affect companies' choices regarding substantial innovation. However, the current carbon trading prices in China are relatively low, and companies are still likely to choose strategic innovation. Moreover, we find that when the substantial innovation of large companies exerts a greater impact on the product revenues of small companies, small companies are more inclined to choose substantial innovation. Therefore, in an effort to induce companies to choose substantial innovation, the CETM should play the leading role in this situation, and the government should implement different innovation subsidies and improve the verification mechanism.

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Section: Green Technology Innovation (Gti) Embodies Both "Innovation"mentioning

confidence: 99%

Substantial innovation or strategic innovation: An evolutionary game analysis of companies' green technology innovation strategies under carbon emission trading market

Cui,

Chun,

Shui

et al. 2024

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Recycling price and service of a platform-based WEEE reverse supply chain under government subsidy

Wan

2024

Clean Techn Environ Policy

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Health evaluation and key influencing factor analysis of green technological innovation system

Liu

Zhang

Wang

et al. 2022

Environ Sci Pollut Res

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Analysis of green technology investment for Chinese waste electrical and electronic equipment processing enterprises under different subsidy modes

Cited by 8 publications

References 40 publications

Substantial innovation or strategic innovation: An evolutionary game analysis of companies' green technology innovation strategies under carbon emission trading market

Substantial innovation or strategic innovation: An evolutionary game analysis of companies' green technology innovation strategies under carbon emission trading market

Recycling price and service of a platform-based WEEE reverse supply chain under government subsidy

Health evaluation and key influencing factor analysis of green technological innovation system

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