Analysis of green supply chains under fairness concern and differential power structure

Abstract

Purpose This study aims to examine how fairness concerns and power structure in dyadic green supply chains impact retail price, supply chain profits and greening level decisions. Design/methodology/approach This study develops game-theoretic models considering fairness concerns and asymmetric power structures under an iso-elastic demand setting. The research paper employs the Stackelberg game approach, taking into consideration the fairness concern of the channel leader. Findings The findings indicate that under fairness, there is an increase in both wholesale and retail prices, as well as greening expenditures. Notably, when comparing the two models (manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg), double marginalization is more pronounced in the retailer Stackelberg setup than in the manufacturer Stackelberg setup. In a traditional supply chain with iso-elastic demand, the follower typically extracts higher profit compared to the leader; however, our results show that, under fairness conditions, the leader achieves higher profit than the follower. Additionally, our study suggests that supply chain coordination is unattainable in a fairness setup. This paper provides insights for managers on the optimal supply chain structure and the level of fairness to maximize profit. Originality/value This paper investigates the impact of a leader's fairness on the optimal decisions within a green supply chain, an area that has received limited attention previously. Additionally, the study investigates how fairness concerns manifest in distinct power dynamics, specifically, in the contexts of manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg.