Analysis of Electric Grid Security Under Terrorist Threat

Salmerón, Javier; Wood, R. Kevin; Baldick, Ross

doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2004.825888

Cited by 453 publications

(334 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…We incorporate reconstitutability by modeling how system components are repaired over time and how a repaired component contributes to improved system value (Salmerón et al [36]). Unless strictly defended or hardened, every system component is assumed to be vulnerable.…”

Section: Criticalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Analyzing the Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure to Attack and Planning Defenses

Brown

Carlyle

Salmerón

et al. 2005

Emerging Theory, Methods, and Applications

104

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We describe new bilevel programming models to (1) help make the country's critical infrastructure more resilient to attacks by terrorists, (2) help governments and businesses plan those improvements, and (3) help influence related public policy on investment incentives, regulations, etc. An intelligent attacker (terrorists) and defender (us) are key features of all these models, along with information transparency: These are Stackelberg games, as opposed to two-person, zero-sum games. We illustrate these models with applications to electric power grids, subways, airports, and other critical infrastructure. For instance, one model identifies locations for a given set of electronic sensors that minimize the worst-case time to detection of a chemical, biological, or radiological contaminant introduced into the Washington, D.C. subway system. The paper concludes by reporting insights we have gained through forming "red teams," each of which gathers open-source data on a real-world system, develops an appropriate attacker-defender or defender-attacker model, and solves the model to identify vulnerabilities in the system or to plan an optimal defense.

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Section: Criticalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Analyzing the Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure to Attack and Planning Defenses

Brown

Carlyle

Salmerón

et al. 2005

Emerging Theory, Methods, and Applications

104

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show abstract

“…Of specific relevance to our work is the literature on security-constrained optimal power flow in situations where large numbers of system components fail. This literature is mostly based on worstcase network interdiction analysis and includes solution methods based on bi-level and mixed-integer programming (see [24,25,1,8,33,32]) and graph algorithms (see [22,3,8,15,16]). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Contingency-constrained unit commitment with post-contingency corrective recourse

et al. 2014

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We consider the problem of minimizing costs in the generation unit commitment problem, a cornerstone in electric power system operations, while enforcing an N-k-ε reliability criterion. This reliability criterion is a generalization of the wellknown N-k criterion, and dictates that at least (1 − ε j ) fraction of the total system demand must be met following the failures of k or fewer system components. We refer to this problem as the Contingency-Constrained Unit Commitment problem, or CCUC. We present a mixed-integer programming formulation of the CCUC that accounts for both transmission and generation element failures. We propose novel cutting plane algorithms that avoid the need to explicitly consider an exponential number of contingencies. Computational studies are performed on several IEEE test systems and a simplified model of the Western US interconnection network, which demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed methods relative to current state-of-the-art.

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“…Then, because of its special structure, we can convert our BLILP into a standard mixed-integer linear program (MILP) to actually solve it. With the roles of attacker and defender reversed, this general idea has been successfully used to model a number of networkinterdiction problems (Phillips 1993, Wood 1993, Israeli and Wood 2002; see Whiteman 2000 for details on an application; see Fulkerson andHarding 1977, Golden 1978 for earlier, bilevel linear-programming models involving continuous interdiction effort; and see Salmeron et al 2004 for an application of a bilevel optimization to interdicting electric power grids). In these network-interdiction problems, an interdictor uses limited offensive resources to attack and damage an adversary's network (e.g., road system, communications network) to minimize the maximum benefit his adversary can obtain from it.…”

Section: A New Two-sided Optimization For Tbmd Planningmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Two-Sided Optimization for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense

Brown

Carlyle

Diehl

et al. 2005

Operations Research

143

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We describe JOINT DEFENDER, a new two-sided optimization model for planning the pre-positioning of defensive missile interceptors to counter an attack threat. In our basic model, a defender pre-positions ballistic missile defense platforms to minimize the worst-case damage an attacker can achieve; we assume that the attacker will be aware of defensive pre-positioning decisions, and that both sides have complete information as to target values, attacking-missile launch sites, weapon system capabilities, etc. Other model variants investigate the value of secrecy by restricting the attacker’s and/or defender’s access to information. For a realistic scenario, we can evaluate a completely transparent exchange in a few minutes on a laptop computer, and can plan near-optimal secret defenses in seconds. JOINT DEFENDER’s mathematical foundation and its computational efficiency complement current missile-defense planning tools that use heuristics or supercomputing. The model can also provide unique insight into the value of secrecy and deception to either side. We demonstrate with two hypothetical North Korean scenarios.

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Analysis of Electric Grid Security Under Terrorist Threat

Cited by 453 publications

References 3 publications

Analyzing the Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure to Attack and Planning Defenses

Analyzing the Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure to Attack and Planning Defenses

Contingency-constrained unit commitment with post-contingency corrective recourse

A Two-Sided Optimization for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense

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