Analysis of BWR long-term station blackout accident using TRAC-BF1

Watanabe, Tadashi; Ishigaki, Masahiro; Hirano, Masashi

doi:10.1016/j.anucene.2012.05.028

Cited by 15 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Provided that this check would have been made earlier, the operators could have recognized the conditions where RCIC was operating, have expected the inevitable trip of RCIC, and then have aligned alternative water injection earlier. According to the analytical results, it is highly likely that the core would have been avoided from damaging if the reactor depressurization and subsequent alternative water injection would have been executed within 13,000 sec (approximately 3.6 h) after RCIC tripped [16]. This implies that the operators would have had time to take actions needed for avoiding core damage.…”

Section: Continuous Operation Of Reactor Core Isolationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Review of five investigation committees’ reports on the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant severe accident: focusing on accident progression and causes¹

Watanabe

Yonomoto

Tamaki

et al. 2014

Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology

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Section: Continuous Operation Of Reactor Core Isolationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Review of five investigation committees’ reports on the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant severe accident: focusing on accident progression and causes¹

Watanabe

Yonomoto

Tamaki

et al. 2014

Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology

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“…Namely, it is expected that heat sink is sufficient, but due to RCS inventory loss sooner or later the core will uncover. With some exceptions, like Fukushima unit 2 accident simulation [8], most of the simulations described in Section 1 rely on power from batteries, including simulations performed for selected PWR dealing with extension of station blackout coping capability [12]. This means that equipment was available during first four to eight hours of the transient only (depending on station blackout coping time), which leads to early core damage.…”

Section: Station Blackout Accidentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As such it is very appropriate to simulate 2 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations long-term sequences with core cooling available. Another example of long-term SBO is study [8], in which BWR longterm SBO accident was analyzed using TRAC-BF1 system code. The reactor core isolation cooling system was actuated in the unit 2 reactor and a stable thermal-hydraulic condition was maintained for about three days.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Long-Term Station Blackout Accident Analyses of a PWR with RELAP5/MOD3.3

Prošek

Cizelj

2013

Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

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Stress tests performed in Europe after accident at Fukushima Daiichi also required evaluation of the consequences of loss of safety functions due to station blackout (SBO). Long-term SBO in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) leads to severe accident sequences, assuming that existing plant means (systems, equipment, and procedures) are used for accident mitigation. Therefore the main objective was to study the accident management strategies for SBO scenarios (with different reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) leaks assumed) to delay the time before core uncovers and significantly heats up. The most important strategies assumed were primary side depressurization and additional makeup water to reactor coolant system (RCS). For simulations of long term SBO scenarios, including early stages of severe accident sequences, the best estimate RELAP5/MOD3.3 and the verified input model of Krško two-loop PWR were used. The results suggest that for the expected magnitude of RCPs seal leak, the core uncovery during the first seven days could be prevented by using the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and manually depressurizing the RCS through the secondary side. For larger RCPs seal leaks, in general this is not the case. Nevertheless, the core uncovery can be significantly delayed by increasing RCS depressurization.

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“…For example, the loss of the RHR during shutdown in dierent plants, has been simulated using best-estimate codes such as RELAP-5 (Hassan and Raja , 1993), (Hassan and Banerjee , 1994), (Ferng and Ma , 1996), , , CATHARE (Hassan and Troshko , 1997), TRAC-BF1 (Watanabe et al , 2012).…”

Section: In Order To Improve the Spent Fuel Pools Safety Analysis Itmentioning

confidence: 99%

Use of TRACE best estimate code to analyze spent fuel storage pools safety

Alberola

Sánchez-Saez

Martorell

2014

Progress in Nuclear Energy

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Nuclear policies have experienced an important change since Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant accident and the safety of spent fuels has been in the spot issue among all the safety concerns. At many countries, the spent fuel of nuclear power plants is not reprocessed so it has to be stored inside the facilities, normally in pools. As nuclear power plants use best estimate codes to perform safety analysis, it is interesting to assess the capacity of such codes to simulate spent fuel pools behavior. This paper uses TRACE thermal-hydraulic code to simulate steady state and transient conditions of spent fuel pools. The steady state results are compared with plant measurements of Maine Yankee with a good agreement between the calculations and the measurements. The transient simulated is a loss of cooling together with a loss of coolant through the transfer channel. TRACE heat transfer radiation model has been activated using the parameters obtained from COBRA thermal-hydraulic code.

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Analysis of BWR long-term station blackout accident using TRAC-BF1

Cited by 15 publications

References 1 publication

Review of five investigation committees’ reports on the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant severe accident: focusing on accident progression and causes¹

Review of five investigation committees’ reports on the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant severe accident: focusing on accident progression and causes¹

Long-Term Station Blackout Accident Analyses of a PWR with RELAP5/MOD3.3

Use of TRACE best estimate code to analyze spent fuel storage pools safety

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Analysis of BWR long-term station blackout accident using TRAC-BF1

Cited by 15 publications

References 1 publication

Review of five investigation committees’ reports on the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant severe accident: focusing on accident progression and causes1

Review of five investigation committees’ reports on the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant severe accident: focusing on accident progression and causes1

Long-Term Station Blackout Accident Analyses of a PWR with RELAP5/MOD3.3

Use of TRACE best estimate code to analyze spent fuel storage pools safety

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

Review of five investigation committees’ reports on the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant severe accident: focusing on accident progression and causes¹

Review of five investigation committees’ reports on the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant severe accident: focusing on accident progression and causes¹