2005
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.003
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Analogy-based expectation equilibrium

Abstract: It is assumed that players bundle nodes in which other players must move into analogy classes, and players only have expectations about the average behavior in every class. A solution concept is proposed for multi-stage games with perfect information: at every node players choose best-responses to their analogy-based expectations, and expectations are correct on average over those various nodes pooled together into the same analogy classes. The approach is applied to a variety of games. It is shown that a play… Show more

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Cited by 329 publications
(222 citation statements)
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“…Gale et al (1995) argue that learning is especially difficult in the ultimatum game and that subgame perfection may be observed in the very long run (see also Roth and Erev, 1995). Jehiel (2005) proposed an analogy-based approach in which first movers discretize their own action space into analogy classes and offer the lower extreme point of the analogy class that would result in acceptance. The reader, undoubtedly, can add to this list.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Gale et al (1995) argue that learning is especially difficult in the ultimatum game and that subgame perfection may be observed in the very long run (see also Roth and Erev, 1995). Jehiel (2005) proposed an analogy-based approach in which first movers discretize their own action space into analogy classes and offer the lower extreme point of the analogy class that would result in acceptance. The reader, undoubtedly, can add to this list.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such a refinement leads to a special case of Jehiel's (2005) analogy based expectation equilibrium (ABEE). The scope of ABEE is much wider since it is defined for extensive form games and for any partition of opponents' nodes in the game tree.…”
Section: Simple Conjectures: a Refinementmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Analogy-based expectations equilibrium, or simply analogy equilibrium, Jehiel 2005;Jehiel and Koessler 2008) provides a powerful tool to understand how steady-state-like equilibrium behavior may differ from Nash equilibrium behavior when players use stereotypical classifications, analogy classes, in learning about others. Stereotypes must be confirmed by experience.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%