Analog Physical-Layer Relay Attacks with Application to Bluetooth and Phase-Based Ranging

Staat, Paul; Jansen, K.; Zenger, Christian; Elders–Boll, H.; Paar, Christof

doi:10.1145/3507657.3528536

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…A recent paper by Staat et al, performed an AF relay attack on Bluetooth Low-Energy (BLE) used for PKES for a vehicle and on a smart lock. They were able to extend the unlocking to 65 m, from the single-digit metre distance expected [32].…”

Section: Relevant Work and Motivationsmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…al, where the quantized CSI from an OFDM pilot is utilized in a similar manner to detect DF relay attacks [30]. The idea of using the CSI was also considered by P. Staat et al as a strong avenue for the design of future protocols, though a specific protocol was not detailed [32]. Work by M. Fomichev et al looked at using a deep neural net on the channel state information from an OFDM exchange to classify 'copresence detection', which is essentially distance bounding [41].…”

Section: Relevant Work and Motivationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Relay Attack Detection using OFDM Channel-Fingerprinting

Abubaker,

Gong

2024

Preprint

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Decode-and-forward and amplify-and-forward relay attacks are a powerful tool for defeating challenge-response authentication protocols. Current solutions for detecting these relay attacks utilize round-trip time distance-bounding. Unfortunately, secure implementations of distance-bounding require dedicated ultra-wideband hardware that only provide low data rates and operate at relatively short distances. In this paper we propose two novel symmetric-key challenge-response authentication protocols that can detect either a decode-andforward relay attack or prevent a decode-and-forward and detect an amplify-and-forward relay attack. Both protocols utilize the channel state information in a far-field communication system to perform the detection. The first protocol utilizes the correlation of the adjusted channel frequency response to detect decode-and-forward relay attacks. The second protocol prevents decode-and-forward relay attacks through the use of randomized pilots, and detects amplify-and-forward relay attacks by classifying the distribution of the channel frequency response that is caused by multiple relays. The protocols utilize orthogonal frequency division multiplexing to estimate the channel frequency response between the legitimate communicating parties to identify if a relay attack is occurring in a physical-layer challenge-response authentication protocol. The proposed protocols can be leveraged on many existing hardware platforms and can simultaneously support high data rates. To evaluate the performance of the protocol, MATLAB simulations are done to gather Monte-Carlo results on performance criterion.

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Section: Relevant Work and Motivationsmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Relevant Work and Motivationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Relay Attack Detection using OFDM Channel-Fingerprinting

Abubaker,

Gong

2024

Preprint

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“…It, therefore, needs to be evaluated how current implementations are behaving. Many PKE systems of cars without UWB have been successfully attacked [4,5] and it is questioned if UWB ToF measurements can solve the existing problems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smartphones with UWB: Evaluating the Accuracy and Reliability of UWB Ranging

Heinrich¹,

Krollmann²,

Putz³

et al. 2023

Preprint

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More and more consumer devices implement the IEEE Ultra-Wide Band (UWB) standard to perform distance measurements for sensitive tasks such as keyless entry and startup of modern cars, to find lost items using coin-sized trackers, and for smart payments. While UWB promises the ability to perform time-of-flight centimeter-accurate distance measurements between two devices, the accuracy and reliability of the implementation in up-to-date consumer devices have not been evaluated so far. In this paper, we present the first evaluation of UWB smartphones from Apple, Google, and Samsung, focusing on accuracy and reliability in passive keyless entry and smart home automation scenarios. To perform the measurements for our analysis, we build a custom-designed testbed based on a Gimbal-based platform for Wireless Evaluation (GWEn), which allows us to create reproducible measurements. All our results, including all measurement data and a manual to reconstruct a GWEn are published online. We find that the evaluated devices can measure the distance with an error of less than 20 cm, but fail in producing reliable measurements in all scenarios. Finally, we give recommendations on how to handle measurement results when implementing a passive keyless entry system.• Reliability and Accuracy of UWB technology. People using UWB as a PKE system need to know if they can rely on accurate measurements. Without this, people will be less likely to adopt the technology and more likely to resist its implementation. A positive evaluation will provide peace of mind to people using a UWBsmartphone as a car key. • Implementation of UWB measurements. Manufacturers

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Analog Physical-Layer Relay Attacks with Application to Bluetooth and Phase-Based Ranging

Cited by 2 publications

References 21 publications

Relay Attack Detection using OFDM Channel-Fingerprinting

Relay Attack Detection using OFDM Channel-Fingerprinting

Smartphones with UWB: Evaluating the Accuracy and Reliability of UWB Ranging

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