An Overview on Deployment Strategies for Global Quantum Key Distribution Networks

Wang, Jing; Huberman, Bernardo A.

doi:10.1155/2022/9927255

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 113 publications

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“…[2][3][4][5] Satellite QKD (SatQKD) is of particular interest due to the ability of a satellite orbiting the earth to pass the same key to parties which are separated beyond the range limits of terrestrial QKD systems. 6,7 The diminishing density of the atmosphere with altitude means that the link to the satellite experiences less loss than an equivalent link at sea level; the effective thickness of the atmosphere (≈ 10km) is much smaller than the average low earth orbit radius (≈ 500km).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An investigation of jamming in free-space quantum key distribution

Simmons¹,

Noblet²,

Castillo³

et al. 2023

Quantum Technology: Driving Commercialisation of an Enabling Science III

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a quantum communications protocol which provides the growth of encryption keys under guaranteed security. Due to the single-photon nature of many QKD protocols, QKD systems can be optically jammed by overwhelming a receiver with many photons at wavelengths at which the single photon detectors are responsive, causing a prohibitively high quantum bit error rate (QBER). In satellite QKD (SatQKD), which relies on communication during brief satellite visual contact, short jamming periods could prevent access to secure communications for much longer periods of time. Optical jamming (OJ) can be achieved both from within line-of-sight by targeting the receiver with a light source, or, in the case of downlink SatQKD, from without line-of-sight by reflecting OJ light off the transmitting satellite.1 The latter attack can be effective 1000km from the ground station, which presents challenges to the deployment of SatQKD in mission-critical applications. In this work, we present two investigations for OJ attacks on SatQKD. Firstly, we present an experimental demonstration utilizing SPAD array technology to locate and mitigate within line-of-sight OJ at long range. Secondly, we present simulations quantifying the effectiveness of without line-of-sight OJ against SatQKD systems and outline mitigation techniques inspired by RF communications. Implementation of the mitigation techniques will be essential for defence applications.

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