An option contract pricing model of relief material supply chain

Liang, Liang; Wang, Xihui; Gao, Jianguo

doi:10.1016/j.omega.2011.11.004

Cited by 89 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Additionally, our research is based on the assumption of a full amount of inventory. Liang et al (2012) proposed that an option contract with two delivery steps allows for a partial inventory, which could further increase the profit of the relief supply chain.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pre-purchasing with option contract and coordination in a relief supply chain

Wang

Feng

Liang

et al. 2015

International Journal of Production Economics

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pre-purchasing with option contract and coordination in a relief supply chain

Wang

Feng

Liang

et al. 2015

International Journal of Production Economics

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“…At present, according to the contract, especially on cost sharing contract mainly concentrated in the field of supply chain has achieved many results [3][4][5][6][7].Cost sharing contract as an important way to achieve supply chain coordination, has been widespread concern and research [8][9][10].Lu Qihui [11]suppose that the market demand and service capacity are respectively related to the support level of service providers and service providers, and establish a service supply chain model based on cost sharing strategy; Gary Huaite [12] by establishing and solving the model found that in a monopoly or oligopoly market, only manufacturers and retailers between the cost sharing contract, it may be effective to maintain its market position; Hu Benyong, Lei Dong and Chen Xu [13] provides an option pricing method based on expected loss, that when the cost sharing and reputation sharing ratio to meet certain conditions, can achieve effective coordination of supply chain.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stochastic Differential Game Analyses of Tailored Taxi Service Coordination by Cost Sharing Contract

Hai-feng¹,

Dan²

2017

Proceedings of the 2017 International Conference on Mechanical, Electronic, Control and Automation Engineering (MECAE 2017)

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Abstract. Cooperation of all the members in the tailored taxi service plays an important role in the development of this fast-developing service industry. The platform enterprise can encourage cooperation from special car drivers by sharing their cost during the service, which we assume can increase the sales by accumulating the reputation of the service model. A differential game model is established with tailored taxi service that consists of one platform enterprise and one special car driver and we derive the optimal solutions of the Stackelberg equilibrium with the platform enterprise as the leader who partially shares the cost of the efforts of the driver and the cooperative game that both layers make efforts together to get the most profits of this system. The results make the benefits of the cost sharing contract in increasing the profits of both players as well as the whole service system, which means that the cost sharing contract is an effective coordination mechanism in the long-term relationship of the members in the service system.

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“…Liang et al introduced the option contract mechanism into relief material supply chain management and demonstrated that with two delivery steps, there is a feasible price range of option contract which can optimize the availability of relief material of both members in the supply chain and make members willing to conduct the transaction with option contracts [24]. Zhao et al developed a supply contract with the bidirectional option for a manufacturer-retailer supply chain and examined the feedback effects of the bidirectional option on the retailer's initial order strategy [25].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modelling Risk Coordination of Supply Chains with Put Option Contracts and Selective Return Policies

Yi¹,

Guo²

2015

Int. j. simul. model.

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To study risk coordination of supply chains, a two-echelon supply chain with one risk-neutral supplier and one risk-averse retailer is constructed, in which the retailer behaves with waste aversion. The retailer's conservative attitude to order results in poor performance of the supplier and the whole supply chain. A new contract which combines put options and selective return policies is developed. The retailer buys option contracts when he places an order, then decides to exercise part or all of them after the sales season so that he can choose the return quantity selectively. The exercise price is equivalent to the wholesale price of merchandise. The result demonstrates that this contract can coordinate the supply chain well and be carried out normally despite the retailer's risk preference being private because the supplier's pricing policy is independent of retailer's risk aversion. The numerical analysis shows that the retailer's expected utility outperforms that of the expected utility under the classical buyback contract.

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An option contract pricing model of relief material supply chain

Cited by 89 publications

References 27 publications

Pre-purchasing with option contract and coordination in a relief supply chain

Pre-purchasing with option contract and coordination in a relief supply chain

Stochastic Differential Game Analyses of Tailored Taxi Service Coordination by Cost Sharing Contract

Modelling Risk Coordination of Supply Chains with Put Option Contracts and Selective Return Policies

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