“…However, to the extent that these firm-specific factors reduce the quality (or precision) of commonly available information, investors' demand for analyst-provided information is expected to shift outward, thereby increasing equilibrium supply. Under the assumption that an analyst is interested in maximizing her expected utility, she will invest effort to generate idiosyncratic information to satisfy investors' demand, up to the point where her marginal costs of generating idiosyncratic information equal the marginal benefits of providing such information to investors (see Barron, Byard, & Yu, 2008;Barth, Kasznik, & McNichols, 2001;Das, Levine, & Sivaramakrishnan, 1998;Djatej, Gao, Sarikas, & Senteney, 2009;O'Brien & Bhushan, 1990). The next section discusses prior studies examining the relationship between corporate disclosure and analysts' efforts.…”