An investigation of pledging behavior to a national charitable telethon

Silverman, Wendy K.; Robertson, Steven J.; Middlebrook, Jimmy L.; Drabman, Ronald S.

doi:10.1016/s0005-7894(84)80033-7

Cited by 32 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Merely knowing that one"s contribution is perceived by others may be enough to motivate people to give. In a study determining factors that influence giving during a telethon, Silverman et al (1984) found that viewers were most likely to give at the times when the names of pledging donors were shown on the screen. Because larger groups are often more anonymous, it may be that incidence and level of donations decrease when group sizes increases in bars and school classes (Wiesenthal et al 1983).…”

Section: Reputationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Generosity and Philanthropy: A Literature Review

Bekkers¹,

2007

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We present an overview of the academic literature on philanthropy, divided in two parts. In part one, we discuss the question of who gives how much; in part two, we discuss the question of why people give. In part one, we survey the literature on characteristics of individuals and households that are related to giving. In part two, we identify eight mechanisms as the most important forces that drive giving: (1) awareness of need; (2) solicitation; (3) costs and benefits; (4) altruism; (5) reputation; (6) psychological benefits; (7) values; (8) efficacy. We evaluate the progress in the almost 500 studies we reviewed and suggest directions for future research on philanthropy.

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Section: Reputationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Generosity and Philanthropy: A Literature Review

Bekkers¹,

2007

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“…Silverman et al (1984) examine data from a national telethon in which three different funding schemes were employed. They find that announcing the names of individuals pledging money and the amount of money pledged resulted in greater 4 There are many ways in which this game can be played in practice.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The informational value of sequential fundraising

Vesterlund

2003

Journal of Public Economics

381

258

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This paper examines a puzzling inconsistency between the theoretical prediction of private provisions to public goods and actual fundraising behavior. While fundraisers often choose to announce past contributions, economic theory predicts that contributions will be largest when donors are uninformed of the contributions made by others. This paper suggests that an announcement strategy may be optimal because it helps reveal the charity's quality. It is shown that when there is imperfect information about the value of the public good and contributors can purchase information regarding its quality, then there exist equilibria in which an announcement strategy is optimal. Interestingly, in equilibrium a high-quality charity receives contributions that exceed those that would result had the quality of the charity been common knowledge. Hence, an announcement strategy not only helps worthwhile organizations reveal their type, but it also helps the fundraiser reduce the free-rider problem. 

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“…In a public-bad setting Moxnes and Van der Heijden (2003) show that the presence of a leader improves the overall outcome, as the average extraction rates are significantly lower with sequential than simultaneous moves. Meidinger and Villeval (2002) also conclude that rec-1 Silverman et al (1984) examine a national telethon and show that announcing the names of individuals pledging money and the amount of money pledged resulted in greater contributions. List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) demonstrate that larger initial contributions increase subsequent donations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study

2007

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We report experimental results on the effect of leadership in a voluntary contribution game. Consistent with recent theories we find that leading-by-example increases contributions and earnings in an environment where a leader has private information about the returns from contributing (Hermalin in Am Econ Rev 88:1188-1206, 1998; Vesterlund in J Public Econ 87: 2003). In contrast the ability to lead-by-example has no effect on total contributions and earnings when such returns are commonly known. In our environment the success of leadership therefore appears to be driven by signaling rather than by nonpecuniary factors such as reciprocity.

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An investigation of pledging behavior to a national charitable telethon

Cited by 32 publications

References 10 publications

Generosity and Philanthropy: A Literature Review

Generosity and Philanthropy: A Literature Review

The informational value of sequential fundraising

Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study

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