“…If informed traders are present in the market, this should be reflected in the spread. Insiders, when trading on their inside information, are better informed counterparties, and any uninformed investor trading against them will lose in the transaction, a notion supported by much research detailing the profitability of insiders even when trading legally (see e.g., for the United States [Jaffe, ; Finnerty, ; Seyhun, , ; Rozeff and Zaman, ; Lakonishok and Lee, ]; for Canada [Baesel and Stein, ]; for Spain [Del Brio, Miguel and Perote, ]; for New Zealand [Etebari, Tourani‐Rad and Gilbert, ]; for the United Kingdom [Pope, Morris and Peel, ; Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks, ]). Hence, if a law reduces the prevalence of insider trading, then the proportion of informed traders in the market should decrease, and this should lead to a decrease in the spread.…”