An Investigation into the Value of Unit Cohesion in Peacetime

Abstract

This documeft hasbeen,-r ,d S o, public release and sale; its distribution i5 mhe contents of this reoort are the authors' personal. opinions and not those of the U.S. Army or the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Unit Climate, Leadership, and Performance: An Aggregate-Level Investigation

“…To be effective, a unit undoubtedly needs to have members who have proficient task mastery (e.g., gunnery skills); however, task mastery alone does not ensure success. Instead, factors such as positive cohesion, effective teamwork, confidence, and physical and mental resilience will weigh heavily on unit success (e.g., Manning & Ingraham, 1987). That is, the social or human dimensions are likely to play a large role in the performance of a unit.…”

“…Manning and Ingraham (1987) first suggested this strategy. In a study examining unit cohesion in military training environments, Manning and Ingraham (1987) suggest that leaders may juggle priorities or even selectively neglect some aspects of performance in lieu of others-depending on each leader's emphasis. If each leader picked priorities slightly different it may account for how their unit performance and how they are rated as leaders.…”

A Model of Family Factors and Individual and Unit Readiness: Literature Review

“…In studies which investigated unit readiness or unit effectivess, the operational definition of readiness has been in terms of unit performance indicators such as AWOL, nonjudicial punishment rate, drug and marijuana offense rate, sick call rates, number of awards, and reenlistment rate (Bowers & Krauz, 1983;Griesemer, 1980;Griesemer & Hart, 1981;Manning & Ingraham, 1978;Spencer, Klemp, & Cullen, 1977;Sterling & Carnes, 1981); subjective global evaluations of combat readiness from unit personnel (Gal, 1986;Griffith & Vaitkus, 1986;Shirom, 1976;Siebold, 1987;Sterling, 1984); ratings of unit performance in simulated combat exercises (Manning & Ingraham, 1978;Olmstead, Elder, and Forsythe, 1978;Spencer, Klemp, & Cullen, 1977;Twohig, Rachford, Tremble, & Williams, 1987); ratings by unit personnel of various aspects of unit climate (Allen & Potter, 1987;Griesemer, 1980;Griesemer & Hart, 1981;Spencer, Klemp, & Cullen, 1977); incidents of combat stress reaction (Solomon, Mikulincer, & Hobfoll, 1986;Steiner & Neumann, 1978); and/or indices similar to those used in preparing the Unit Status Report (Bowers & Krauz, 1983;Manning & Ingraham, 1978;Spencer, Klemp, & Cullen, 1977).…”

Year 2 Assessment of the Unit Focused Stability Manning System

“…When employed in the service of personnel replacement within the U.S. Army, however, IRS produced an unintended side effect, excessive turbulence, so disruptive that it eventually was identified as a principal cause of weakened unit cohesion. Ever since the seminal work of Shils and Janowitz (1948), moreover, group cohesion consistently has been cited as a key factor in determining military performance (Manning & Ingraham, 1987;Oliver, Harman, Hoover, Hayes, & Pandhi, 1999;Siebold, 1999). Not surprisingly, the Army soon initiated systematic investigations of alternative manning systems.…”