An Introduction to the Philosophy of Fanaticism

Abstract

Social life is plagued with discord, strife, and division. Groups animated by competing ideals vie with one another for dominance; proponents of competing visions of the good life accuse one another of being reprehensible or deluded; factionalization splinters communities; people with polarized social identities see members of outgroups as enemies to be defeated or overcome. In the worst cases, violence erupts, with proponents of incompatible ethical visions resorting to riots, insurrection, and terrorism. It would be myopic to think that there is a single cause of social discord. But some philosophers have thought that among the welter of causes, we can single out one of great importance: fanaticism.Below, I o er an introduction to the philosophy of fanaticism. Fanaticism is a multivalent concept, with di erent philosophers o ering strikingly varied analyses of its central features. Some philosophers treat fanaticism as an epistemic defect, others as moral defect, and others, still, as a psychological defect. Some philosophers treat all instances of fanaticism as negative or objectionable, whereas others think that there can be positive manifestations of fanaticism. Some see fanaticism as a fringe state, present only in extreme, pathological cases, whereas others see it as more widespread, a feature of large swathes of society. Some see it as essentially religious, whereas other disagree. But what's not in doubt in any of these analyses is that addressing fanaticism puts us in a position to analyze, and perhaps even take some steps to addressing, a perennial source of social discord. Fanaticism's Emergence as a Central Philosophical ConcernIf we try to picture the fanatic, what's likely to come to mind is the religious extremist, the fervent neo-Nazi, the jihadist, the terrorist. We imagine the fanatic as passionately committed to some cause or identity; as dogmatically, stubbornly resistant to compromising, attenuating, or rethinking that cause or identity; and as carrying out terrible acts of violence to achieve it. The term "fanatic" has functioned in that way since the sixteenth century. Widespread religious dissent and uprisings, often stoked by individuals who claimed uniquely authoritative, divinely sanctioned insights into the putatively correct social order, made this problem especially salient at that time. For these conflicts confronted thinkers with a di cult question: what should we make of these religious dissidents and social reformers,